Philosophically, the argument in this article is ridiculous, and to end with the suggestion that philosophers should consult psychologists is just a bit of silly one-up-man-ship.
First of all, you can't judge a philosophical argument by answers to polls. If someone is going to blame another because he/she can no longer fulfil his or her promises because being unable to do so, then there is something terribly wrong with the judgement. If I promise to take someone to X in my car, and my car is not working, then I cannot be obligated to fulfil the promise, since I cannot. He will have to find another way to X. But if I puncture my gas tank in order to sabotage someone's chances of getting a job, because this will make it impossible for me to fulfil my promise, I have already broken my promise, since that is something I could have done had I not perfidiously punctured my gas tank, which in itself is refusing to take the person to the airport, despite my being (having been) able to. And polls have nothing to do with the finding of either innocence or guilt. My car being broken down (through no fault of my own) means that I cannot fulfil my promise, regrettable as that may be. Having (for self-serving reasons) made my car incapable of fulfilling my obligations, does not diminish my obligation. In fact, it makes my failure to fulfil my obligation a more serious moral fault. Where in all this is Kant shown to be wrong?
First of all, you can't judge a philosophical argument by answers to polls. If someone is going to blame another because he/she can no longer fulfil his or her promises because being unable to do so, then there is something terribly wrong with the judgement. If I promise to take someone to X in my car, and my car is not working, then I cannot be obligated to fulfil the promise, since I cannot. He will have to find another way to X. But if I puncture my gas tank in order to sabotage someone's chances of getting a job, because this will make it impossible for me to fulfil my promise, I have already broken my promise, since that is something I could have done had I not perfidiously punctured my gas tank, which in itself is refusing to take the person to the airport, despite my being (having been) able to. And polls have nothing to do with the finding of either innocence or guilt. My car being broken down (through no fault of my own) means that I cannot fulfil my promise, regrettable as that may be. Having (for self-serving reasons) made my car incapable of fulfilling my obligations, does not diminish my obligation. In fact, it makes my failure to fulfil my obligation a more serious moral fault. Where in all this is Kant shown to be wrong?
5
I have two major problems with the underlying premises of this article:
1) The authors seems to think “ought implies can” is equal to “can implies ought” – that being able to do so something ethical means you ought to do that thing, and since the study participants refuted that, saying that “blame implies ought” instead that this somehow refutes “ought implies can” as well. To my understanding, “ought implies can” only means that you cannot obligate someone to do something when that thing is impossible for them to do. Refuting “can implies ought” does not refute “ought implies can” – these are two different concepts that, while strongly related, are ultimately different. Under Kantianism, the only circumstance under which “can implies ought” has any force as a rule is when the Categorical Imperative says you ought to do something in the first place and your description of the study says nothing about the Categorical Imperative.
1) The authors seems to think “ought implies can” is equal to “can implies ought” – that being able to do so something ethical means you ought to do that thing, and since the study participants refuted that, saying that “blame implies ought” instead that this somehow refutes “ought implies can” as well. To my understanding, “ought implies can” only means that you cannot obligate someone to do something when that thing is impossible for them to do. Refuting “can implies ought” does not refute “ought implies can” – these are two different concepts that, while strongly related, are ultimately different. Under Kantianism, the only circumstance under which “can implies ought” has any force as a rule is when the Categorical Imperative says you ought to do something in the first place and your description of the study says nothing about the Categorical Imperative.
2
"Ought implies can" obviously depends on the meanings of each word. Empirical evidence is relevant only if it's relevant to them. Would you ask ESL students if it's true?
Each word is capable of multiple interpretations The "Collegiate" offers four "oughts" 1 obligation (ought to pay debts. 2 advisability (ought take care of yourself) 3 expectatation (ought to be here by now) 4 logical consequence--i.e implication itself. And four "implies" And seven "cans"--as an intransitive verb.
Can't as inability ranges from impossible (logical, physical, psychological, circumstantial) to mere lack of motivation (can't because you don't feel like it or procrastination). Mere motivational inability does not defeat duty. Nor does ignorance due to neglect--when you ought to have known.
Excuses include all those cases where duty is not negated despite inability--but criminal or civil liability is at least diminished. The bus broke down does not negate a duty to show up for work on time; but it defeats civil liability--IN FAIR systems. In others even the impossibility of doing the wrongful act (you weren't born) does not defeat liability-- Yahweh will still punish you for your great grandfather's sins.
Furthermore--31 % of YOUR participants SAID "ought"; did 69% expressly SAID "not-ought? Nor do we know a thing about their linguistic competence--especially legalese. Nor do we know yours. Yet you say "This finding has an important implication: Even when WE say..." Who's WE?
Each word is capable of multiple interpretations The "Collegiate" offers four "oughts" 1 obligation (ought to pay debts. 2 advisability (ought take care of yourself) 3 expectatation (ought to be here by now) 4 logical consequence--i.e implication itself. And four "implies" And seven "cans"--as an intransitive verb.
Can't as inability ranges from impossible (logical, physical, psychological, circumstantial) to mere lack of motivation (can't because you don't feel like it or procrastination). Mere motivational inability does not defeat duty. Nor does ignorance due to neglect--when you ought to have known.
Excuses include all those cases where duty is not negated despite inability--but criminal or civil liability is at least diminished. The bus broke down does not negate a duty to show up for work on time; but it defeats civil liability--IN FAIR systems. In others even the impossibility of doing the wrongful act (you weren't born) does not defeat liability-- Yahweh will still punish you for your great grandfather's sins.
Furthermore--31 % of YOUR participants SAID "ought"; did 69% expressly SAID "not-ought? Nor do we know a thing about their linguistic competence--especially legalese. Nor do we know yours. Yet you say "This finding has an important implication: Even when WE say..." Who's WE?
2
I remember little of Philosophy 101. Yet somehow i still manage to have an opinion about this discussion. I would, if I were the woman driving, call a cab or another friend to take my passenger to the airport. But, that's just me. What happens if that is not possible? Neither a friend or a cab could deliver my passenger on time. Back to square one.
I have no idea if Kant had a definition for the word "ought" which required the "ability" to act in the manner prescribed. But, to me THAT seems imperative. Otherwise how can one say that one "ought" to do anything? One simply cannot do what one cannot do!!! I also think that "ought" does imply blame if one does not do that thing.
Ought the driver spend her last $20 on gas to take her friend to the airport instead of feeding her children or having enough gas to get to work herself??? This is stupid. Philosophy/Philosophers always have flaws. Quite frankly, I resent the use of blame and shame to motivate people. And that is exactly what "ought" often equates. I would never have asked my friend to drive me. I would have taken a cab. Unless of course, I couldn't.
I have no idea if Kant had a definition for the word "ought" which required the "ability" to act in the manner prescribed. But, to me THAT seems imperative. Otherwise how can one say that one "ought" to do anything? One simply cannot do what one cannot do!!! I also think that "ought" does imply blame if one does not do that thing.
Ought the driver spend her last $20 on gas to take her friend to the airport instead of feeding her children or having enough gas to get to work herself??? This is stupid. Philosophy/Philosophers always have flaws. Quite frankly, I resent the use of blame and shame to motivate people. And that is exactly what "ought" often equates. I would never have asked my friend to drive me. I would have taken a cab. Unless of course, I couldn't.
1
It's a very short leap from "ought" to "should". Most people believe that if someone can do a (good) thing they should and, if they should they will. If one should and doesn't, then the blame comes in.
"empirical philosophy" If we're going to measure, then let's do it completely. If 2/3ds are for, then 1/3rd is not, and more likely 5% are off in the weeds elsewhere so you always have 3 different populations.
Seems to me being popular isn't the same as being correct. It's more like choosing a Top 40 hit on uToob. Or a president. Popularity only measures popularity.
Seems to me being popular isn't the same as being correct. It's more like choosing a Top 40 hit on uToob. Or a president. Popularity only measures popularity.
3
Is this apparent disagreement the outcome of an imprecise use of tenses by the experimental philosophers? In the case of a deliberate puncture, I would say, "She ought to have...," not "She ought." She ought to have done something differently in the past. At this point, she may no longer have a good choice of action, so her "oughts," present tense, might involve how we think she should feel about what she has done, and maybe new obligations she has incurred by her actions.
1
"Ought" implies "must". The suggestion of moral judgment as proof of Kant's
proposition is explained by the inherent belief functions of our neural systems.
Ought is implied when we accept the illusions of successful habitual behavior patterns. This is not an error. It is the unconscious acceptence of the certainty principle of belief, the only proof through faith and trust in the authority of successful survival social behavior patterns.
proposition is explained by the inherent belief functions of our neural systems.
Ought is implied when we accept the illusions of successful habitual behavior patterns. This is not an error. It is the unconscious acceptence of the certainty principle of belief, the only proof through faith and trust in the authority of successful survival social behavior patterns.
1
This seems fairly simple to me. By introducing the fact that the driver punctured her own tank in the past, you are introducing the driver's choice. Thus, at one point the driver could have driven the other person, but made a blameworthy decision not to. So she "should have" driven her. If you put the possibility or impossibiity into the present and don't bring the past deeds into it, the results should comport with Kant and common sense. This may be the point the authors are making, but if so, it doesn't seem to undermine Kant in any manner.
Philosophical arguments rely on agreement about the meanings of words. I can only understand what you are saying if I already have similar thoughts in my mind. I might process information that I already own to a more complex level with input from you. If I don't already have certain concepts, meanings, associations, and ways of processing them in my mind, I can't really learn anything from you. And vice versa. Our common mental structures, for lack of a better word, and our shared experiences as human beings make it possible for us to communicate. Using every argument that you could possibly come up with to make a point would probably be meaningless to a cat or to an alien. Discussing the nuances of "should" and "ought" and "soll" would not go well with a reptile. No amount of explanation, clarification, training, and education would enable a lizard to communicate with a human about love, for instance.
And so, the very concept of "ought" is more about constructs within our own minds than about the more social aspects of what it might mean. Just as politics is local, morality is individual. When two individuals have developed similar constructs about morality in their own minds, even if to different stages of sophistication, there is a reasonable chance that they could agree on some aspects of that term. If enough people agree in this manner, one could say that morality is something that applies to all of us. But how similar are the basics in our minds?
And so, the very concept of "ought" is more about constructs within our own minds than about the more social aspects of what it might mean. Just as politics is local, morality is individual. When two individuals have developed similar constructs about morality in their own minds, even if to different stages of sophistication, there is a reasonable chance that they could agree on some aspects of that term. If enough people agree in this manner, one could say that morality is something that applies to all of us. But how similar are the basics in our minds?
This study seems to miss a very basic point about the temporal component to morality. Blame has nothing to do (at least directly) with what one ought to do in the present. It is a judgement about what one ought to have done differently in the past and therefore what level of restitution is appropriate in the present. The restitution that one ought to do in the present can only be selected from things which are physically possible, i.e. what one can do.
In the second scenario with the malicious intent, it is perfectly reasonable to blame the driver and say that they ought to have done something different (not sabotaged the car). This is not the same thing as saying that they still ought to drive the now broken down car. That would be completely nonsensical, and I very much doubt that is what anyone in the survey was thinking about when you asked them if the friend still ought to drive the person to the airport. Rather, the appropriate question is, should the friend still be responsible for finding some way of honoring the spirit of the agreement to get the person to the airport: call an Uber for instance. In other words, some form of restitution that the friend still _can_ do.
In the second scenario with the malicious intent, it is perfectly reasonable to blame the driver and say that they ought to have done something different (not sabotaged the car). This is not the same thing as saying that they still ought to drive the now broken down car. That would be completely nonsensical, and I very much doubt that is what anyone in the survey was thinking about when you asked them if the friend still ought to drive the person to the airport. Rather, the appropriate question is, should the friend still be responsible for finding some way of honoring the spirit of the agreement to get the person to the airport: call an Uber for instance. In other words, some form of restitution that the friend still _can_ do.
The law of contracts has been working on these types of breaches for centuries. First we must recognize that not all promises are enforceable. Only those that create an obligation. In this case the doctrine of promissory estoppel would create an obligation on the promissor to somehow get the promissee to the airport. How about calling a friend, relative, or taxi? How about taking a later flight? If all reasonable alternatives have been attempted and none was possible then the promissor has an excuse for the non-performance: impossibility. This excuse could remove some, but not necessarily all, of the liability for the breach of contract. Damages for such a breach might include compensation for the promissee's provable job application costs, but would not include the lost wages for a job that was still not secured. If the car's dysfunction was intentionally caused by the promissor then impossibility does not apply and punitive damages could be sought. So, the 'ought' still stands whether the car's breakdown was the fault of the promissor or not, however, the amount of fault/liability depends on the facts.
1
The article describes an experiment in which researchers dared to collect evidence to explore a classic question. (One can, of course challenge the validity of the conclusion. That's science.)
The criticisms, however, offer little more than "No, they're wrong" and one invalidates the study by stating that philosophy is not the study of how people DO think but of how people SHOULD think.
Shouldn't the former inform the latter? Let's face it, the sin of this work is not in the conclusion but in the fact that someone made an attempt at an INFORMED conclusion.
Oh, the Humanities!
The criticisms, however, offer little more than "No, they're wrong" and one invalidates the study by stating that philosophy is not the study of how people DO think but of how people SHOULD think.
Shouldn't the former inform the latter? Let's face it, the sin of this work is not in the conclusion but in the fact that someone made an attempt at an INFORMED conclusion.
Oh, the Humanities!
1
The noted Psychologist, Albert Ellis, wrote that should's musts, oughts and have to's are thoughts that are associated with feelings of anger, rage, anxiety,procrastination and depression. One of his favorite and really humorous line in lecturing and psychotherapy was: don't should on yourself. In procrastination a person tells herself that that she SHOULD finish the spreadsheet report by four o'clock. As the day progresses she repeatedly delays doing the report while telling herself she has to get the report done. Whenever she uses the should her anxiety goes up. to self-sooth she delays and calls a girlfriend. The four o'clock deadline comes and goes and the report is not completed. Her anxiety level go up and she says to herself " I didn't get it done and I should have. Now I could be in trouble at work. I could lose my job. That would really put me in a fix. I am a loser." How to change the self demand and lower the anxiety? Stop "shoulding" on yourself. Change the should to; IT WOULD BE BETTER if I started the spreadsheet. Thus the demand becomes an option in the conditional tense and is perceived as a good act and anxiety remains low.
Great if the friend can deliver, no matter what. Other wise the guy/girl should call a cab or Uber. Let's use some common sense here.
It seems to me this is primarily a matter of tense. For the woman who sabotages her own car, we would say she "ought to have" driven him to the airport, unless there was some alternative manner in which she actually still could drive him, and only then would we say she still "ought to" drive him.
Ethics is what we do when we talk about ethics, not the ethics themselves. That's religion. Surely Kant is not 'wrong' because a group of people given a very unlikely situation in one (and only one) survey disagree with him. This sounds like what happens when psychologists get out of their intellectual comfort zone.
This article, and apparently the research, misses entirely the normative claim and standards that Kant presented. One of the most interesting and confounding aspects of the categorical imperative is the necessity that one's intentions be regarded as the example for other people's choices. In this case, ought means that one should intend to do something good, at which point the success or failure of your efforts is irrelevant, not whether you actually can, literally, do what you intended to do; if you intended to do something good, and you made a sincere effort to do it, even if you failed you are praiseworthy and blameless according to Kant. This sets up absurdities, of course, and the standards that Kant puts into place are even more absurd — you must always intend to do what would be generally regarded as the right thing to do, and which must always serve as an example of the right thing to do, e.g. you must always be honest, never lying, because you assume no one wants to be lied to and want to serve as an example to everyone, for all time, everywhere, that being honest is the morally good way to act — but the exact conflation of ought and can that is asserted by Chituc and Henne does not exist in Kantian philosophy.
1
Unlike the physical sciences, such disciplines as philosophy, history, literature, (as opposed to works of fiction, drama and poetry) and the social sciences, are academic: in order to function they must abstract themselves from actuality, from nature, the physical, the domain of life, of flux and change. They must stop time. The referents of their words are other words, 'principle' and 'reason', for instance. Like those who collect butterflies and realize when it's too late that they've murdered what they sought to possess - the wonder, what it was about the butterfly that got them. (See Nathaniel Hawthorne's "The Artist of the Beautiful.)
The driving-to-the-airport story bears no relation to actuality. It's one of those bogus "philosophical" questions. In life, every millisecond is unique. A trillion different things can happen on a drive, and between two people.
Why won't religion and art go away?
Because they seek to be true to life as we know it.
The driving-to-the-airport story bears no relation to actuality. It's one of those bogus "philosophical" questions. In life, every millisecond is unique. A trillion different things can happen on a drive, and between two people.
Why won't religion and art go away?
Because they seek to be true to life as we know it.
They've conflated 'ought' with 'should have'. Once the gas tank is punctured, intentionally or not, the friend can no longer drive you to the airport. There is no forward-looking 'ought' left. It is no longer possible in any case. But the retrospective 'should have' remains. She ought not have sabotaged the gas tank & should have driven you to the airport.
This article is reminiscent of the "ordinary language" school of philosophy that briefly threatened to carry all philosophical problems before it, in the middle of the last century. The new twist is the use of polling to establish the facts about what “we” do or don’t say. But it remains as far from proving anything about the philosophical argument as ever. As some have noted, Kant’s imperative implies capacity (else the moral law is empty). But suppose that the empirical research demonstrated that (for some sample of speakers of some sort of English) we tend to say that a person ought to do something if (but only if) they can be blamed for not doing it. It looks awfully as if the concept of blameworthiness here inherits the problem of emptiness that was supposed to infect the concept of obligation. What is the point of blaming your friend for not doing something if they couldn’t have done it? Like some others, I carried on reading the article because I was mildly intrigued by the idea of counter-examples that would enforce an “ought” judgement in circumstances where capacity was lacking. I am not alone in feeling cheated.
The authors of this study have really just introduced -- and then ignored -- a third option: "could have".
Accountability has always been a matter of agency. "Can" implies no agency, and so we're not likely to attribute any kind of moral value to it. "Could have" directly implies agency, and creates the opportunity for blame.
The study they provide would have been much clearer and much more straightforward if they had acknowledged that distinction. Instead, they've conflated the two, and then claim to have reached some kind of sensationalistic finding.
Accountability has always been a matter of agency. "Can" implies no agency, and so we're not likely to attribute any kind of moral value to it. "Could have" directly implies agency, and creates the opportunity for blame.
The study they provide would have been much clearer and much more straightforward if they had acknowledged that distinction. Instead, they've conflated the two, and then claim to have reached some kind of sensationalistic finding.
Perhaps the best thing that ought to be said about this essay is that it's not sullying the sometimes questionable content of Ther Stone series. Of course, sullying the reputation of the Gray Matter series is no gainer.
The matter allegedly at hand is silly. The situation is contrived. The resolutions suggested are either obviously desirable or impossible.
It wasn't a 'thought experiment' that was reported, it was a REAL experiment, or (at best) a Facebook survey.
Immanuel Kant was an 18th century German. What 18th century German words were used in the writings being compared to modern English, and modern colloquial English at that?
The matter allegedly at hand is silly. The situation is contrived. The resolutions suggested are either obviously desirable or impossible.
It wasn't a 'thought experiment' that was reported, it was a REAL experiment, or (at best) a Facebook survey.
Immanuel Kant was an 18th century German. What 18th century German words were used in the writings being compared to modern English, and modern colloquial English at that?
Language! I have another option; that is to replace the word "ought" and "can" with, "required to". At least then I am given a choice of action.
This entire project/experiment is absurd. While the thoughts of a particular audience may or may not hold weight in this context, Kant's dictum stands or falls on its own. Numbers don't dislodge the logic. Besides, this is Kant we're talking here!
Foolish experiments aside, his dictum stands. If one is powerless to affect something, then it is senseless to assign to her any responsibility for affecting it; and without that responsibility, no moral judgment can rightfully be applied.
Foolish experiments aside, his dictum stands. If one is powerless to affect something, then it is senseless to assign to her any responsibility for affecting it; and without that responsibility, no moral judgment can rightfully be applied.
Since when were moral obligations determined by a vote?
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I find this whole discussion pointless, in a way that only philosophers are able to.
No wonder most of us just don't care about anything they pretend to talk about.
No wonder most of us just don't care about anything they pretend to talk about.
"...we offer empirical evidence suggesting that Professor Sinnott-Armstrong was right [that 'ought' does not always imply 'can']."
People's intuitions about a claim constitute "empirical evidence" for the truth-value of the claim? Please.
Yes, experimental philosophy has served in recent years to expand the discussion in a numbner of ways, and philosophers ought to consider empirical findings that bear on philosophical issues. But psychologists ought to be clear about what constitutes empirical evidence; otherwise they should perhaps find another line of work.
People's intuitions about a claim constitute "empirical evidence" for the truth-value of the claim? Please.
Yes, experimental philosophy has served in recent years to expand the discussion in a numbner of ways, and philosophers ought to consider empirical findings that bear on philosophical issues. But psychologists ought to be clear about what constitutes empirical evidence; otherwise they should perhaps find another line of work.
This is laughable, and a good example of why so much of contemporary philosophy is so trivial. In the first example, why is the woman's friend obligated to drive her to the airport? Ever heard of a taxi? If she sabotages the car and thus makes her friend miss the plane, Kant has clear explanations (well, as clear as Kant ever gets) about why we should judge her actions morally wrong, so this complicated example the philosophers have cooked up hardly "refutes" Kant.
The case of the car breaking down accidentally is more complicated, since a moral issue is not at stake regarding the friend's behavior; it was just bad luck. I still wonder whether the woman really had a right to ask her friend to do her a favor when she knew they were competing for the same job; this puts her friend in a rather awkward position that doesn't need to occur (unless she freely volunteers to do so). But such a case, while complicated morally, does an even worse job of "proving" the claim that Kant was wrong. I think the authors gave their study such a dramatic title--We Prove Kant Wrong--just to tempt Times readers into paying attention to their nattering.
The case of the car breaking down accidentally is more complicated, since a moral issue is not at stake regarding the friend's behavior; it was just bad luck. I still wonder whether the woman really had a right to ask her friend to do her a favor when she knew they were competing for the same job; this puts her friend in a rather awkward position that doesn't need to occur (unless she freely volunteers to do so). But such a case, while complicated morally, does an even worse job of "proving" the claim that Kant was wrong. I think the authors gave their study such a dramatic title--We Prove Kant Wrong--just to tempt Times readers into paying attention to their nattering.
I believe that this argument is based on a misinterpretation of Kant. It is not that the person in the event of either accidental or intentional car breakdown is obligated to drive the person to the airport, but rather that she is obligated to try to drive or at least try to help the other person get to the airport. How hard she should try will vary based on circumstances, on an assessment of the probabilities of succeeding by one method or another weighed against risks and costs.
Also, this thought experiment does not deal with the question of whether the woman who already interviewed for the job has disclosed this to the other person. Is she obligated to do that, and does whether or not she has disclosed influence her first obligation in any way?
An experiment is like an opinion poll. It does not tell us anything much about moral argument as such, only about what sort of moral arguments or criteria for moral decision some culturally conditioned subset of humans may use.
Also, this thought experiment does not deal with the question of whether the woman who already interviewed for the job has disclosed this to the other person. Is she obligated to do that, and does whether or not she has disclosed influence her first obligation in any way?
An experiment is like an opinion poll. It does not tell us anything much about moral argument as such, only about what sort of moral arguments or criteria for moral decision some culturally conditioned subset of humans may use.
Take your choice:
1. "Ought" implies "can".
2. "Ought" implies "should, if possible".
I choose 2.
1. "Ought" implies "can".
2. "Ought" implies "should, if possible".
I choose 2.
The authors of the study need to disambiguate 'blame'. In other words, we 'blame' because there's a failue of 'responsibiity' with respect to what we assess was possible for another person to do.
In concept of "duty" in the law of negligence, it is no defense to a claim of breach that one delayed until the obligation was no longer possible to perform. If "ought" in the philosophical sense implies "duty," then Kant and Anglo-American jurisprudence have been in conflict from the beginning.
"Even still" as used in the article is a nonsense mashup of "still" and "even so," and one hopes common use of it will soon be abandoned.
"Even still" as used in the article is a nonsense mashup of "still" and "even so," and one hopes common use of it will soon be abandoned.
'Experimental philosophy' may be beneficial for investigating moral issues like the one presented but the relative nature of its results, which will vary sample, makes it a poor tool for making statements about a carefully defined proposal which is assumed to be 'universal'. If the authors persist in their conclusion then they will also need to accept the relative nature of any ethical conclusions that they 'discover', as the only universal will be 'when in Rome do as Romans do'.
Personally I do not see how one can maintain a set of absolute ethical laws which are not eventually contradictory, one can almost always construct an a situation where the ethical thing to do is to break one or more of the laws, but that doesn't mean that other well defined constructs are not valid. As others have suggested pursuing a different question than the one posed by Kant will have a different outcome, and an interesting one might be 'why would it be ethical to not take your friend to the airport?'
Personally I do not see how one can maintain a set of absolute ethical laws which are not eventually contradictory, one can almost always construct an a situation where the ethical thing to do is to break one or more of the laws, but that doesn't mean that other well defined constructs are not valid. As others have suggested pursuing a different question than the one posed by Kant will have a different outcome, and an interesting one might be 'why would it be ethical to not take your friend to the airport?'
This study is fascinating, however, it misses the point of the relationship between ought and can for Kant which is purely practical for the individual actor. The idea is that the actor must think it is possible to do something in order to seriously strive for it. It would quite literally be incoherent for me to try to jump twenty feet in the air because I know it can't be done. Or, to try to drive you to the airport with no means to do so; the immoral part would offering to do so, essentially lying, not the not driving you. The relationship between ought and can is not there to judge whether you ought to blame someone else for their action, but as a necessary practical postulate, i.e. something I MUST believe it is possible in order to try at all. Though this idea may complicate Kant's categorical imperative - act as though you would will it as a universal maxim (the golden rule). Moreover, Kant's claim can also be understood as prescriptive rather than descriptive to some extent. It would be hard to believe that Kant didn't understand that some people think illogically - i.e. don't see a necessary relationship - in their moral claims; if anything he is offering a corrective.
1
Ought is right up there with should and must in my opinion and
that makes it- according to Albert Ellis- an irrational claim.
that makes it- according to Albert Ellis- an irrational claim.
Maybe it's just not the best example here, but it doesn't really present any moral confusion except maybe in the way it's worded. It is very simple:
She promises to drive you to the airport.
1. If she drives you to the airport, great.
2. If she intentionally makes it impossible for her to drive you to the airport, this is an immoral act. Your example is like asking if a murderer ought to attend the victim's funeral instead of saying that she should not have killed him in the first place.
3. If an unexpected problem arises, it's a bit trickier to put in words, but not to understand: she should make at least as much effort to ensure you get to the airport as she would if it were her who had the interview - maybe she orders you a taxi, maybe she flags down a passing truck, or whatever. She is not required to do more than she would do for herself (e.g. order a helicopter).
Perhaps this is not a good example because most people in that situation would do anything possible to ensure that they were not and were not seen to be the cause of you losing out - both morally and socially, nobody wants to get a job by being the cause of a friend missing out.
She promises to drive you to the airport.
1. If she drives you to the airport, great.
2. If she intentionally makes it impossible for her to drive you to the airport, this is an immoral act. Your example is like asking if a murderer ought to attend the victim's funeral instead of saying that she should not have killed him in the first place.
3. If an unexpected problem arises, it's a bit trickier to put in words, but not to understand: she should make at least as much effort to ensure you get to the airport as she would if it were her who had the interview - maybe she orders you a taxi, maybe she flags down a passing truck, or whatever. She is not required to do more than she would do for herself (e.g. order a helicopter).
Perhaps this is not a good example because most people in that situation would do anything possible to ensure that they were not and were not seen to be the cause of you losing out - both morally and socially, nobody wants to get a job by being the cause of a friend missing out.
This "experimental" approach seems like it may lead to some interesting results, but it is immediately obvious that they will be valid (at most) for the specific language in which the experiment is held and for the specific society and culture of the experiment subjects. All the experiments in the world won't (can't, ought not) disprove what Kant argued in eighteenth-century Königsberg.
Is there something subversive to Kant in the fact that English-speakers blame people, and say "You ought to X," even when they know it's no longer possible to actually do X? Surely not. All this suggests is that they understand X as having been an available choice, at least at one point in time, and they see the obligation in the direction of X as something whose force isn't simply erased when you incapacitate yourself.
It's fundamentally a religious thing. Blaming is a necessity for religious people who struggle to consider themselves as good human beings.
I don't think the driver is relieved of the obligation to try, whether or not she or he was responsible for the situation. We are constantly pushing the boundaries of our abilities and apparent limitations, whether that is putting a man on the moon or breaking an athletic record. We are resourceful, creative creatures and the effort to try might have led to an unforeseen solution not an option in the problem statement. Maybe the driver would have invented a service she could call on her cell phone to pick her up and driver her someplace and put it on her credit card.
My suggestion would be this person should pick her friends more carefully.
Just read Nietzsche.
1
A classic example of why metaphysics and philosophy in general has become irrelevant in western culture.
The guideposts for ethical behavior and morality now reside where they belong -In the realm of neuroscience!
The murky quest for answers to questions that cannot be found, continue to titillate a few in the cobwebbed halls of academia; but have become intellectually vestigial.
Long overdue!
The guideposts for ethical behavior and morality now reside where they belong -In the realm of neuroscience!
The murky quest for answers to questions that cannot be found, continue to titillate a few in the cobwebbed halls of academia; but have become intellectually vestigial.
Long overdue!
Surely this merely shows that most people will (I believe correctly in this example) equate 'can' with 'could have'. The driver has chosen to make herself unable to fulfil her obligation, so it still follows (in the example) that she ought to have kept her promise.
Three motivators: love, obligation and fear. Obligation is a rational principle that we adopt as a way, a dominant principle in our lives and to dp otherwise violate our dignity. Blame is a fear principle that we will be punished by the other. Fear is also the fear of punishment. the love principle is grounded in the integration of the self and then the integration with that which is about. We are lovers, rationalists or just plain scared. What do you think?
The "ought" applies to all rational beings under similar circumstances. If a rational being discovers through a process that includes the categorical imperative that there is an "ought" (moral imperative), then it implies that the moral act can in fact be done. What "can" implies will change from situation to situation, but the moral imperative does not change. I am morally obliged to save the life of a fellow human being if I can. If saving a life means performing emergency open heart surgery, then I am not obliged to perform the surgery because I cannot. But I am morally obliged to do whatever I can given the situation, such as calling for help.
The example of driving someone to the airport and then not being able to complete the act is just plain silly. According to Kant the moral act consists of rationally recognizing the "ought" and then the willing of it. If I fail in my attempt to complete the moral deed but I have made a reasonable attempt through my willing then it is a moral act.
The example of driving someone to the airport and then not being able to complete the act is just plain silly. According to Kant the moral act consists of rationally recognizing the "ought" and then the willing of it. If I fail in my attempt to complete the moral deed but I have made a reasonable attempt through my willing then it is a moral act.
This is the silliest reading of Kant I have ever seen.
She ought to *have* driven her friend to the airport. It *still* makes no sense to say she *ought* to, simplicitaire.
To paraphrase Kant: "you can't have an obligation to do something that is impossible." I think that stands. Messing with Kant is not for the weak at heart.
Assume that you have an obligation to meet someone at the airport and it is possible for you to get there in time. If you proceed to deliberately make it impossible to get there, your obligation is gone, but you are left guilty of a broken promise.
Assume that you have an obligation to meet someone at the airport and it is possible for you to get there in time. If you proceed to deliberately make it impossible to get there, your obligation is gone, but you are left guilty of a broken promise.
"This principle — that “ought” implies “can,” that our moral obligations can’t exceed our abilities — ...".
What does this mean? Does it mean that obligations should not be considered *mandatory* beyond the ability to perform them, or does it mean that it is impossible to *conceive* of an obligation that cannot be met?
What a way to start a philosophical argument - complete ambiguity!
What does this mean? Does it mean that obligations should not be considered *mandatory* beyond the ability to perform them, or does it mean that it is impossible to *conceive* of an obligation that cannot be met?
What a way to start a philosophical argument - complete ambiguity!
1
"We found a consistent pattern, but not what most philosophers would expect." Within that strange and absurd comment lies the soul of why I have always rejected the idea that psychology has anything useful to say about philosophy, or, indeed, about most of life. A contrived social experiment with dubious connection to any reality, and the straw-men philosophers whose expectations are so tidily reduced to a quip of an idea so it can be "disproved". If this was the kind of work I was expected to do with my graduate degree, I'd keep the mcjob.
I'm sorry, but you seem to have fallen in a very obvious trap. I'm not a good speaker of English (as if it weren't obvious) but mind you, CAN in English means both ABILITY (I can climb this hill in 10 minutes - I'm able to climb this hill) and ALLOWABILITY (Baby you can drive my car - Baby you are allowed to drive my car). Now, Kant never says that Ought implies Can in the ABILITY sense, but in the ALLOWABILITY sense. It would be absurd, and if you're looking to logic, you're mixing deontic operators (yes if something is mandatory, than something is allowed) with modal operators (of something is necessary, that something is possible...). Kant (and moral reasoning) would never argue OUGHT hence Ability , but OUGHT hence allowed; otherwise, it's absurd to say "If i cannot pay my debts I shouldn't pay my debts". (which is the contraposition of the inference Ought hence Can).
My brain hurts! OMG, such a simple problem so much thought!
It would be interesting to know the cultural background of the people who were in the study. For instance, if you asked the same questions in Japan, my experience is that that someone making this promise would do everything that they possibly could to make sure that it was followed through on. The person the promise was made to would be much less forgiving, even in extreme circumstances, and would want to be assured that the person making the promise exhausted all means to fulfill it. Honor would be at stake. I am sure that there are cultures that would have similar attitudes.
Two commenters here, Prof. Jai Prakash Sharma and William Egginton offer the view that the authors of article have misrepresented Kant's view in the first place (in fact perhaps Kant actually agrees with the authors) and that if the authors still want to make an argument against ought implying can they should not bring up the name of Kant in making their argument.
Prof. Jai Prakash Sharma: The moral duty of an individual is the necessity to act according to what's dictated by the categorical imperative (a reflection of moral universalism) which becomes a supreme moral principle in itself. Thus ought means can in Kant's moral philosophy.
William Egginton: Unfortunately the authors misrepresent Kant when they claim that in his thought obligation implies ability. "You can because you must" was his way of insisting that obligation is prior to ability, which is very different from claiming moral obligation to be circumscribed by what we can or cannot achieve at any given time. Our obligation to follow the law stems from our nature as beings capable of reason. That obligation is independent of individual inclination or circumstance. If something is the right thing to do it will be the right thing regardless of limitations in the physical world.
Prof. Jai Prakash Sharma: The moral duty of an individual is the necessity to act according to what's dictated by the categorical imperative (a reflection of moral universalism) which becomes a supreme moral principle in itself. Thus ought means can in Kant's moral philosophy.
William Egginton: Unfortunately the authors misrepresent Kant when they claim that in his thought obligation implies ability. "You can because you must" was his way of insisting that obligation is prior to ability, which is very different from claiming moral obligation to be circumscribed by what we can or cannot achieve at any given time. Our obligation to follow the law stems from our nature as beings capable of reason. That obligation is independent of individual inclination or circumstance. If something is the right thing to do it will be the right thing regardless of limitations in the physical world.
Kant's premise is that there are 'limits to knowledge', that the 'thing-in-itself' can never be known. It has led us down the road to scientific materialism with disastrous results for science and religion/spirituality. There are no limits to human knowledge if we engage/intuit with the unseen with the same rigor that we analyze the natural world thru observation and experimentation.
Interesting that the author describes this as empirical data, what amounts to poll taking. Since when is opinion soliciting considered experimental data?
I only wish that Kant could be here to offer a reply ...
is this a really question about morality, or is it a question about the manner in which we use language? There are various ways to frame these situations ... perhaps we might seek to define our words more precisely, as in, for example, whether we are mistaking "ought" for "should". You might say that it doesn't matter that much, and then Kant might say that you "should" (or, perhaps, "ought" to) reconsider the way that you are using the word "ought".
is this a really question about morality, or is it a question about the manner in which we use language? There are various ways to frame these situations ... perhaps we might seek to define our words more precisely, as in, for example, whether we are mistaking "ought" for "should". You might say that it doesn't matter that much, and then Kant might say that you "should" (or, perhaps, "ought" to) reconsider the way that you are using the word "ought".
1
I would add to some of the other comments suggesting the authors are not quite getting Kant's moral philosophy correct. I'm no expert on Kant but my understanding is that moral 'imperatives' are SELF legislative rules that we apply to our own behavior. It seems self evident that in the context of asking what ANOTHER person should do we will err toward our best interest. Now perhaps the application of the categorical imperative to others in 'blaming' is an inappropriate use of it in judging our own behavior in a derivative sense but I don't know.
There are however problems with Kant's view in my opinion since he uses it to tether his idea of human freedom which was a critical element of what he wanted to say (and what this era of the late enlightenment and the French revolution was about in general) If we are not 'determined' by birth and circumstance then hereditary class distinctions are simply arbitrary.
The difficulty in my mind is that he relies on pure practical reason to develop irrefrangible moral imperatives that we fashion and then apply to our behavior (acting legislatively and judicially). This seems to be question begging since in that case 'reason' determines our behavior and circumscribes freedom of the will as much as any other determining factor would. He wanted to have his cake and eat it too-human freedom of will but a code of moral duty that did not permit deviation.
There are however problems with Kant's view in my opinion since he uses it to tether his idea of human freedom which was a critical element of what he wanted to say (and what this era of the late enlightenment and the French revolution was about in general) If we are not 'determined' by birth and circumstance then hereditary class distinctions are simply arbitrary.
The difficulty in my mind is that he relies on pure practical reason to develop irrefrangible moral imperatives that we fashion and then apply to our behavior (acting legislatively and judicially). This seems to be question begging since in that case 'reason' determines our behavior and circumscribes freedom of the will as much as any other determining factor would. He wanted to have his cake and eat it too-human freedom of will but a code of moral duty that did not permit deviation.
Your study can't really "refute" Kant. Kant was trying to construct a "metaphysics of morals" -- a rational system by which the morality of an action could be deduced. Your study is concerned only with how humans happen to think about morality.
You seem also to be eliding pertinent features of how humans think about morality. When we blame our friend in the airport scenario, is it with the thought that she ought to have taken us to the airport or that she ought not to have punctured her gas tank? Do we really consider it "impossible" for her to have taken us, or are we indignant that she didn't find some other way of performing the obliged task? If your research didn't capture that, it's not really answering the question.
You seem also to be eliding pertinent features of how humans think about morality. When we blame our friend in the airport scenario, is it with the thought that she ought to have taken us to the airport or that she ought not to have punctured her gas tank? Do we really consider it "impossible" for her to have taken us, or are we indignant that she didn't find some other way of performing the obliged task? If your research didn't capture that, it's not really answering the question.
1
Moral philosophers need to realize just how relative moral precepts are. Blame is hardly a matter of logic.
"Philosophers ought to pay more attention to their colleagues in the psychology department..." They ought to indeed. And they ought to pay more attention to evolutionary biology and neurobiology. Philosophers have rarely been shy about thinking they have enough data, but science unfolds and grows.
The Yahwist gave us weird myths of creation and of the human condition. Others built on those and gave us Original Sin, the Fall, the Soul, and the Immaculate Conception (i.e., Mary was free of Original sin by divine intervention). Cathars, Calivinsts, and Jansenists gave us their sour thoughts on the world and on ourselves. But "the fault is not in our stars, dear Brutus, but in ourselves."
"Philosophers ought to pay more attention to their colleagues in the psychology department..." They ought to indeed. And they ought to pay more attention to evolutionary biology and neurobiology. Philosophers have rarely been shy about thinking they have enough data, but science unfolds and grows.
The Yahwist gave us weird myths of creation and of the human condition. Others built on those and gave us Original Sin, the Fall, the Soul, and the Immaculate Conception (i.e., Mary was free of Original sin by divine intervention). Cathars, Calivinsts, and Jansenists gave us their sour thoughts on the world and on ourselves. But "the fault is not in our stars, dear Brutus, but in ourselves."
1
This is ridiculous! 'Blame' derives from 'can'. She CAN not sabotage her car.
'Ought' derives from both 'can', and 'could have'. 'Ought' is not possible given 'can't' AND 'couldn't'.
This is not inconsistent. The authors are blinded by tense.
'Ought' derives from both 'can', and 'could have'. 'Ought' is not possible given 'can't' AND 'couldn't'.
This is not inconsistent. The authors are blinded by tense.
As everyone ought to understand, the implication of can in the use of the word should is only an implication. If one considers a universe of can and a universe of should, the intersection of the two is being posited as greater than the that portion of should which is separate. If overplayed over that combined universe of the two is a third, the land of the blameworthy, it must be mediated by the done, the not done, and the intentionally not done. This mediating layer or filter means that our Venn diagram is multi-layered.
In effect, we have here nothing more than the realization that the taxonomy of meaning is not simplistic, a realization that one would have hoped philosophy had long since understood.
In effect, we have here nothing more than the realization that the taxonomy of meaning is not simplistic, a realization that one would have hoped philosophy had long since understood.
I thought Edmund Husserl had chased this kind of "psychologism" out of logic over a century ago. Kant was making a logical, not a psychological, point. The fact that the layperson misunderstands moral obligation has as little bearing on its essential nature as arithmetical misunderstandings have on mathematical truths.
One of the main goals of serious ethical thinking is to help us to find the way to truth in situations where our emotions tend to lead us astray. Thus, we may well have a *feeling* that our friend should keep her promise, even if she actually can't, but our feeling is not an ethical datum; it's just a selfish and self-interested reflex.
One of the main goals of serious ethical thinking is to help us to find the way to truth in situations where our emotions tend to lead us astray. Thus, we may well have a *feeling* that our friend should keep her promise, even if she actually can't, but our feeling is not an ethical datum; it's just a selfish and self-interested reflex.
1
This is an example of why so many avoid studying philosophy. Reminds me of the Church trying to decide how many angels can dance on the head of a pin.
Immanuel Kant, left his house every day at the same time for an afternoon walk, to the point the neighbors adjusted their watches to the time. He only missed one day. That day he died.
Sheesh. We have the good fortune, or misfortune, of living in a unique time, paralleled by little else in human history. Digital communications have, within less than a generation, irrevocably altered our lives, how we communicate, how we work, how we socialize.......and increasingly, how we think. "First man makes the tool, then the tool makes the man." We're all evolving as part of an incidental sociology experiment, not just through using computers, but increasingly thinking as they do, becoming as they are, distancing ourselves from our animal selves. As 3-D gives way to zero-D, the course of human evolution is irrevocably changing.......and in what direction?
And who is discussing this? Which is to say, though I do appreciate philosophy issues in the NYTimes, by comparison this "can-versus-ought" thing makes me think of sequestered monks arguing about how many angels can dance on the head of a pin.
And who is discussing this? Which is to say, though I do appreciate philosophy issues in the NYTimes, by comparison this "can-versus-ought" thing makes me think of sequestered monks arguing about how many angels can dance on the head of a pin.
Call me an foolish, naive neophyte if you'd like, but I've long been admittedly confused by Kant's 'Categorical Imperative'. If we were to really just sit down and consider all the possible consequences of every single action we take, would anyone actually be DOING anything in this world? Besides sitting around in eternal contemplation, that is?
I'd just love some enlightenment here. Is any forthcoming? Or will we just be contemplating THAT?
I'd just love some enlightenment here. Is any forthcoming? Or will we just be contemplating THAT?
What a banner year it has become for the natural sciences!
1. Gravitational waves, 100 years in the making
2. Now, equally startling revelations on the “ought” implies “can” question which has troubled all of mankind since 1787, a real shockwave that once again the Homeland Security Apparatus failed to anticipate.
Now, I'm sure the Mexicans have no way out paying to build that wall!
1. Gravitational waves, 100 years in the making
2. Now, equally startling revelations on the “ought” implies “can” question which has troubled all of mankind since 1787, a real shockwave that once again the Homeland Security Apparatus failed to anticipate.
Now, I'm sure the Mexicans have no way out paying to build that wall!
While I agree that the "split between Philosophy/Psychology' was unfortunate,
I find the writing style in this article to be opaque and, as such,
not a valid critique of Kant.
I find the writing style in this article to be opaque and, as such,
not a valid critique of Kant.
1
Anyone who asks a ride from someone with such an obvious conflict of interest deserves to not get the job. I certainly wouldn't hire someone who doesn't understand basic game theory. Morality (as well as religion, emotions and intelligence) has adaptive purpose. It evolved to facilitate reciprocal altruism and trade, the true hallmarks of our species. We should evaluate it in evolutionary terms, not philosophical ones. M
The authors of this article seem to be arguing that they can determine the correctness of Kant's moral arguments by polling or surveying average citizens. That is, they are not attempting to prove Kant wrong by finding fault with his reasoning, but by showing that most people in their studies disagree with Kant. If this is a valid method for discovering the truth, then it should also work with scientific truth or mathematical truth. Would it have been a legitimate shortcut in the recent effort to determine whether gravity waves really exist, if we had just asked groups of citizens whether they found the idea plausible? I don't think so. Surveying citizens can help us to understand how people think, but it is an unreliable guide as to what is true.
I read Kant on the subway traveling to CCNY in the 1960s and to be honest it did not make sense to me. I read him later and realized the reason it didn't make sense on the subway was because it doesn't make sense. Kant was trying to prove the existence of a categorical imperative (God?) that does not exist. Morality is culturally based, which is why this experiment also does not make sense.
2
Consider another case where someone -- for whatever reason -- did not fulfill a promise. President Obama came to prominence and ran on the platform of "No Blue America, No Red America," in essence committing to healing the rift between liberal and conservative factions in our country. Most would say, I think, that he has so far been unsuccessful in this quest. But about half the country gives him something of a pass, believing that it was through no fault of his own (i.e. it was because of obstructionist tactics by his political opponents). Whereas the other half of the country seems to put the blame squarely on the President himself, referring to him with epithets such as "divisive." So now does the fact that there is such pointed disagreement as to whether he is responsible for his lack of success in this realm, tell us anything about one's obligation to fulfill one's promises? Or does it tell us more about the human tendency to view others through our own tribal, us-vs-them, lens?
Empirical science in philosophy -- "experimental philosophy" -- is the best we can do now? Kant was wrong, or at least can be shown in some instances to be wrong without aid of experiment. But if experiment does not lead to theory, then moral philosophy becomes descriptive rather than deductive, which may be fine but needs to be explicit. This writer would like to think that moral philosophy is deductive, once we construct valid -- answerable -- questions.
While this study gets the psychology right, it misunderstands the philosophy. The modification to the thought experiment does not contain a maxim that could be universalized without defeating its own purpose {I will promise to take my friend to the airport, and then puncture my gas tank so I am unable to do so, effectively making a "lying promise"}. In this way the complication between "can" and "ought" wouldn't be found in a Kantian reading of this thought experiment - while she can no longer drive her friend to the airport, she ought not to have made a lying promise to do so in the first place. It makes no sense to say she still ought to take her friend to the airport because she never intended to - she ought not to have made the lying promise.
Perhaps a more appropriate experiment is to ask, "If your friend knew she would be unable to drive you to the airport without somehow sabotaging your flight would she still be obligated to say she would?" the reason for this being more appropriate is that it calls into question the ability of can before the promise is actually made.
The concept of "blame" also seems like a strange concept to apply to Kantian ethics because it involves a third party who is dictating the nature of an "ought," whereas moral obligations are determined by an internal law.
Perhaps a more appropriate experiment is to ask, "If your friend knew she would be unable to drive you to the airport without somehow sabotaging your flight would she still be obligated to say she would?" the reason for this being more appropriate is that it calls into question the ability of can before the promise is actually made.
The concept of "blame" also seems like a strange concept to apply to Kantian ethics because it involves a third party who is dictating the nature of an "ought," whereas moral obligations are determined by an internal law.
I think that the question can dictate an implicit bias, thus affecting the thought and principle experimental outcome in a detrimental way. I think Kant was talking about the self, not some selfless or selfish act to be committed by another, and relied upon by someone else, entirely.
"We presented hundreds of participants ...".
Thereby hangs some relevant tale, I suspect.
Firstly, one does not know whether the participants were representative of the human pollution as a whole (I would guess not: probably young white people for the most part). This quasi-experiment would need to be related several times with several different looking samples to establish any kind of conviction.
Secondly, outcomes of these sorts of quasi-experiments are notoriously dependent on how the question at issue is framed and pricing effects. There is little doubt that another study could be done using a quite different presentation in which the outcome would be significantly different. Even catching people in a different mood is likely to make difference, etc.
This is a consistent problem with this kind of research (aka: social science research): separate the signal from the noise in the absence of any rich casual model of the phenomenon under study.
In addition to these observations, it may simply be a matter of usage: some may use the word in one way others in another with there being no unique lexical fact of the matter. This is consistent with all sharing the same, but yet to be precisely specified, sense of moral compulsion.
I would not abandon Kant yet - at least not on the basis of this research.
Thereby hangs some relevant tale, I suspect.
Firstly, one does not know whether the participants were representative of the human pollution as a whole (I would guess not: probably young white people for the most part). This quasi-experiment would need to be related several times with several different looking samples to establish any kind of conviction.
Secondly, outcomes of these sorts of quasi-experiments are notoriously dependent on how the question at issue is framed and pricing effects. There is little doubt that another study could be done using a quite different presentation in which the outcome would be significantly different. Even catching people in a different mood is likely to make difference, etc.
This is a consistent problem with this kind of research (aka: social science research): separate the signal from the noise in the absence of any rich casual model of the phenomenon under study.
In addition to these observations, it may simply be a matter of usage: some may use the word in one way others in another with there being no unique lexical fact of the matter. This is consistent with all sharing the same, but yet to be precisely specified, sense of moral compulsion.
I would not abandon Kant yet - at least not on the basis of this research.
1
Interesting!
But the experimental results do now show what the authors think they do, because there is a conceptual error from the start: Kant's thesis that "ought" implies "can" applies to PREscriptive judgments - judgments that play the role of directives for action; they guide before a person has acted. The thesis does not apply to DEscriptve judgments - judgments of what a person has done, after the action has taken place (in fact, or hypothetically).
Once this distinction is recognized, it also becomes clear how the results of experiments like these are red herrings for the bulk of moral philosophy. As the task is understood in much of moral philosophy, Kant was developing a system of prescriptions, and so, he was concerned with the logical soundness of these prescriptions. He was not cataloguing the norms that ordinary people (who often have inconsistent judgments) IN FACT adopt, but developing a system of prescriptions that they SHOULD adopt.
The upshot: The study of moral judgments is a rich and interesting area. But it is best to learn the full range of distinctions that moral philosophers have developed and work with before jumping to conclusions. To do so is like thinking one has refuted Newton's law of gravity by pointing out that feathers hit the ground later that rocks do. You have to know your way around the mistakes, and avoid them, before your conclusions can be accepted.
But the experimental results do now show what the authors think they do, because there is a conceptual error from the start: Kant's thesis that "ought" implies "can" applies to PREscriptive judgments - judgments that play the role of directives for action; they guide before a person has acted. The thesis does not apply to DEscriptve judgments - judgments of what a person has done, after the action has taken place (in fact, or hypothetically).
Once this distinction is recognized, it also becomes clear how the results of experiments like these are red herrings for the bulk of moral philosophy. As the task is understood in much of moral philosophy, Kant was developing a system of prescriptions, and so, he was concerned with the logical soundness of these prescriptions. He was not cataloguing the norms that ordinary people (who often have inconsistent judgments) IN FACT adopt, but developing a system of prescriptions that they SHOULD adopt.
The upshot: The study of moral judgments is a rich and interesting area. But it is best to learn the full range of distinctions that moral philosophers have developed and work with before jumping to conclusions. To do so is like thinking one has refuted Newton's law of gravity by pointing out that feathers hit the ground later that rocks do. You have to know your way around the mistakes, and avoid them, before your conclusions can be accepted.
16
But suppose the woman needs the job because her family is out of money; there is an element of desperation to her unsavory act of puncturing the gas tank. And for the man, he is compensated well in his current job; the new job is merely icing on his already financially rewarding cake.
Clearly we accuse her of puncturing the tank; but one could argue that she ought to help her desperate family, in which case we do not blame her for puncturing the tank; in fact, some of us feel that she *ought* to have punctured that tank. Indeed, we could view it as a *moral obligation* for her to puncture the tank, *were it within her *capability* to do so*.
In this counterfactual, "ought" regains some relationship to ability, but has the moral condition that needy families come first over the desires of the well-to-do. We could say, "The poor girl's family is in dire straights. I feel that she ought to puncture that tank because she knows how to do it and it helps the family if she gets that job, not that no good rogue."
In conducting an experiment on this topic, I'm not so sure that their isn't some systemic bias in the plan of experiment. It sets up the conditions in which subjects are forced to recognize a difference between *accident*, a probabilistic situation in which the tank ruptures on its own, and a certain act which is not stochastic in nature but a deliberate plan to leak the gas for personal gain.
Clearly we accuse her of puncturing the tank; but one could argue that she ought to help her desperate family, in which case we do not blame her for puncturing the tank; in fact, some of us feel that she *ought* to have punctured that tank. Indeed, we could view it as a *moral obligation* for her to puncture the tank, *were it within her *capability* to do so*.
In this counterfactual, "ought" regains some relationship to ability, but has the moral condition that needy families come first over the desires of the well-to-do. We could say, "The poor girl's family is in dire straights. I feel that she ought to puncture that tank because she knows how to do it and it helps the family if she gets that job, not that no good rogue."
In conducting an experiment on this topic, I'm not so sure that their isn't some systemic bias in the plan of experiment. It sets up the conditions in which subjects are forced to recognize a difference between *accident*, a probabilistic situation in which the tank ruptures on its own, and a certain act which is not stochastic in nature but a deliberate plan to leak the gas for personal gain.
1
Very confused philosophizing. It appears that these "experimental" philosophers don't know the past form of 'can'.
The woman ought to have driven her friend to the airport (after promising to do so, and thereby obligating herself to do so) because she *could have* done so. She just chose not to. And that is where blame comes in. That she cannot drive her friend to the airport after she punctures a hole in her own gas tank is wholly irrelevant to what she ought to have done.
The woman ought to have driven her friend to the airport (after promising to do so, and thereby obligating herself to do so) because she *could have* done so. She just chose not to. And that is where blame comes in. That she cannot drive her friend to the airport after she punctures a hole in her own gas tank is wholly irrelevant to what she ought to have done.
In the example presented, the friend ought not to have punctured her gas tank. That is where the ought comes in, because that is what she had the ability to (not) do.
1
I'm not convinced that the modified thought experiment illustrates any problem with 'ought implies can'. The 'friend' (certainly she is not really a friend if she engages in such deception) was in fact able to drive you – that is, before she deliberately disabled her car. So when she says that she can drive you (which would imply that she actually intends to do so), she's lying to you. It's clear then, that it is within her ability to choose to sabotage her own car, and to lie to you. It would be a waste of everyone's time to debate whether or not she 'ought' not to do either of those things within this context.
I have to say, I really find that this article has a bizarre tone, especially with the preoccupation with the word "blame" – it almost seems as if the author thinks deception is fair (i.e. moral). Cringe worthy.
I have to say, I really find that this article has a bizarre tone, especially with the preoccupation with the word "blame" – it almost seems as if the author thinks deception is fair (i.e. moral). Cringe worthy.
The author's argument is purely semantically. Once the friend punctures the gas tank intentionally, the meaning of ought changes from "should drive me but won't" to "should drive me but can't". No pun intended!
1
So the friend offers to drive the other job applicant to the airport. But in that offer, there's a larger implied and valid obligation -- particularly in this circumstance in which the two are competing for the same job.
And that obligation, once the offer is accepted, is to make sure the guy gets to the airport and makes his flight, preferably by driving him there but ultimately by whatever means necessary. Period.
So the friend whose car sputters to a stop still "ought" to somehow see that the friend makes his flight -- by helping him thumb a ride, calling an Uber, flagging a taxi, whatever. THAT is the obligation (not the driving itself) and that is how the question should have been framed.
If the friend just throws up her hands and refuses to take any action once the car breaks down, she fails to fulfill the obligation. She may think, "Gee, what a lucky break for me! I really intended to help my friend catch his flight but my gas tank leaked and now I'll get the job. Moreover, I don't have to blame myself! Sweet!"
Perhaps we've all had experiences a bit like this, being spared from an unpleasant obligation by unforeseen intervening events. It's that "Whew, I dodged a bullet that time" kind of experience, though it may not have any clear moral implications. In this example, there is absolutely a moral component and, given the way this experiment was framed, I would say that Kant's argument has not been disproved -- though it may still be with a better set-up.
And that obligation, once the offer is accepted, is to make sure the guy gets to the airport and makes his flight, preferably by driving him there but ultimately by whatever means necessary. Period.
So the friend whose car sputters to a stop still "ought" to somehow see that the friend makes his flight -- by helping him thumb a ride, calling an Uber, flagging a taxi, whatever. THAT is the obligation (not the driving itself) and that is how the question should have been framed.
If the friend just throws up her hands and refuses to take any action once the car breaks down, she fails to fulfill the obligation. She may think, "Gee, what a lucky break for me! I really intended to help my friend catch his flight but my gas tank leaked and now I'll get the job. Moreover, I don't have to blame myself! Sweet!"
Perhaps we've all had experiences a bit like this, being spared from an unpleasant obligation by unforeseen intervening events. It's that "Whew, I dodged a bullet that time" kind of experience, though it may not have any clear moral implications. In this example, there is absolutely a moral component and, given the way this experiment was framed, I would say that Kant's argument has not been disproved -- though it may still be with a better set-up.
We ought not to leave questions of morality up to popular vote, if we can.
28
The notion that a survey of n subjects yields a particular response has nothing to do with the validity of a proposition. If the article reports the study accurately, it's a silly study.
Seems to me, one ought not rely upon one's competitor for assistance in defeating her. One clearly could have taken a cab.
1
It seems to me that "ought" is pregnant with "can" only up to the point when one is making the ethical choice, in the cited example, when the friend is deciding whether or not to revoke her promise. Once she literally goes into the tank, the airport is seemingly off her choice list. That does not mean, if she wants to be ethical, that she ought not do something else to right the wrong, e.g., like calling her new employer and telling them she cannot accept the job until they interview you.
1
Why would I depend upon the person with whom I am competing for a job (friend or not) to drive me to the airport for a flight I cannot miss without losing hope of obtaining the job?
2
I don't think you can separate blame from can. The reason people do.not want to "unfairly" blame the friend is that she cannot do what you are asking her to. That is why it would be unfair to blame her. The whole point of "ought" is that someone is open to being blamed if they fail to do what they ought. But if they cannot do so, it would be unfair to blame them for not doing it and therefore there is no "ought".
"She ought to drive me to the airport" implies "She ought not intentionally puncture her gas tank to avoid driving me." Puncturing the tank is no different than intentionally driving in the wrong direction here. The obligation survives the deviation, because the deviation is hers. The thought experiment seems ill contrived.
2
A job is a critical thing for anyone. To have been part of arranging a ride necessary to get to a job interview with a friend who has already interviewed for that same job is potentially difficult, if not disastrous. Who ought not to have done that? It was unkind. Somehow psychologists keep failing to take real humans into account in these thought experiments. It is some kind of clinical inhumanity. They are to blame for that.
1
As someone who studied both philosophy (BA) and social science (anthropology MA), I am squirming a bit with embarrassment for the social sciences after reading this article. The many layers of logical error in this study, which render it utterly silly, are a common problem undercutting the usefulness of much of social science research. Other commenters have pointed out the many thought errors, some quite eloquently, so I won't repeat.
4
Anyone who'd risk a crucial job on a ride to the airport from a direct competitor for that job spent too many formative years reading Kant, and too few hanging out in pool halls.
2
Perhaps this essay is also a thought experiment and the authors will now write another essay in which they conclude that all (in the relatively absolute sense they use here) of the people who commented on it agree they fail to prove their premise that “Philosophers ought to pay more attention to their colleagues in the psychology department” if the result is the type of experiment in philosophy they describe.
4
I don't think it's just "ought" vs "can" or "ought" vs "blame". I think it's "ought" vs "try". If someone promises to take you to the airport, but an accident, like a leaking gas tank, stops them, their obligation to "can" is over, but they still have an obligation to "try". This might involve finding and paying for a taxi. Perhaps they flag down a passing car. So in an accidental scenario, as long as they "try" to fulfill the promise in reaction to an accidental inability to "can", they have acted honorably.
This "thought experiment" establishes why much of the work of social psychologists must be taken with a grain of salt. The problem with the problem as phrased is that it uses language to make it appear that tow issues are interrelated when they are not. In asking a friend to drive you to the airport, you are asking the friend to assist you in your effort to be considered for a job. The friend could have sabotaged you in any number of unethical ways in connection with the car ride to the airport that would have all sabotaged you to the same extent. To focus on the literal "failure" to drive you to the airport misses the point. Your friend could have included materials in the car that would have caused you to have a terrible flu at the time of the interview or caused you to have a terrible odor that you could not rid yourself of at the time of the interview. In both cases, your friend would have driven you to the airport, but would have had the same degree of moral culpability as if she intentionally caused her car to break down in a way that you could not get alternative transportation to the airport. The issue is not the literal commitment made by the implications of that promise It is only by focusing on the literal language that one creates a false "ought" does not necessarily imply "can" situation.
12
I think such experiments often miss the mark because they ignore pragmatic assumptions or possibilities that subjects might consider automatically given a scenario. When the friends intentionally breaks down the car, "she ought to drive you to to the airport" is interpreted as "does she have a moral responsibility to get you to the airport"? The answer is obviously yes to the latter question. That is what people are answering. They are thinking in terms of practical alternatives to something that is literally undoable. She could hail a cab and get you to the airport. She told you she would get you to the airport, and that's what she does. The precise wording "she ought to drive you" is interpreted loosely, because in real life, it is irrelevant. If she could get a cab and get you to the airpot, the trivial detail that the taxi driver would be driving and not her, is not important. In real life people deal with goal and intentions and don't get hung up on exact wording. There are technical objects to maybe half of the things we say in casual conversation, if we try to stick to exact wording, but we let it go and use experience to decide what things mean practically.That's what may subjects are doing, is my guess.
The "ought" applies to all rational beings under similar circumstances. If a rational being discovers through a process that includes the categorical imperative that there is an "ought" (moral imperative), then it implies that the moral act can in fact be done. What "can" implies will change from situation to situation, but the moral imperative does not change. For example, I am morally obliged to save the life of a fellow human being if I can. If saving a life means performing emergency open heart surgery, then I am not obliged to perform the surgery because I cannot. But I am morally obliged to do whatever I can, even if it is no more than calling for the help that I cannot offer.
The example of driving someone to the airport with various reasons why the "can" is lifted is silly. By intentionally removing the ability to get to the airport is in no way mitigates the universal law of morality. It just means I have chosen not to obey the moral law. The person who attempts to drive the friend to the airport but whose car breaks down has obeyed the moral law. Kant says that even if I fail in my honest attempt, I have still engaged in the "ought" (and by extension the "can") through my willing.
The example of driving someone to the airport with various reasons why the "can" is lifted is silly. By intentionally removing the ability to get to the airport is in no way mitigates the universal law of morality. It just means I have chosen not to obey the moral law. The person who attempts to drive the friend to the airport but whose car breaks down has obeyed the moral law. Kant says that even if I fail in my honest attempt, I have still engaged in the "ought" (and by extension the "can") through my willing.
There is a slight misunderstanding of Kant here. Kant's "categorical imperative" (= "ought" always means you must) applies ONLY when one has rationally concluded that one can. In other words, the presupposition is that one has seriously considered a course of action, including that it can be performed, and if this is the case, then one has decided that one "ought" to do the said procedure. Kant was not a silly thinker.
Now, St. Augustine DID say that when God gave a command, he also gave the grace necessary to fulfill the command: God never commands something that is impossible for the commanded. In this case, it is indeed the case that if God commands something, one can do it.
Now, St. Augustine DID say that when God gave a command, he also gave the grace necessary to fulfill the command: God never commands something that is impossible for the commanded. In this case, it is indeed the case that if God commands something, one can do it.
13
This article (and presumably the entire study) displays a disturbing lack of understanding of both the central goal of Kant's moral philosophy, as well as the capacity for social science to answer to philosophical questions.
Kant was seeking to answer the question, "what must I do?" He was not seeking to answer the question the study seems to have invited participants to answer, "whom can I blame?" Kant's moral philosophy, is prospective, trying to create a set of rules by which people can decide what action to take. That you might be thwarted in acting morally by the world itself is simply not relevant to the question.
It is certainly relevant to the question of whom to blame, however. One cannot be blamed for failing to accomplish the impossible.
But the researches aren't really even testing the philosophical limits of blame! Moral Philosophy no more rests on public opinion than gravity does. We already have a well-established system for apportioning blame -- the justice system. It does consider public opinion to some degree (juries, elections), but even it requires a set of rules to guide that opinion.
These researchers seem to be engaged in nothing more than creating one of those surveys which dominate the internet. Interesting and fun, and maybe there is even some decent social science there. They certainly tell us nothing about philosophy or Kant, though.
Kant was seeking to answer the question, "what must I do?" He was not seeking to answer the question the study seems to have invited participants to answer, "whom can I blame?" Kant's moral philosophy, is prospective, trying to create a set of rules by which people can decide what action to take. That you might be thwarted in acting morally by the world itself is simply not relevant to the question.
It is certainly relevant to the question of whom to blame, however. One cannot be blamed for failing to accomplish the impossible.
But the researches aren't really even testing the philosophical limits of blame! Moral Philosophy no more rests on public opinion than gravity does. We already have a well-established system for apportioning blame -- the justice system. It does consider public opinion to some degree (juries, elections), but even it requires a set of rules to guide that opinion.
These researchers seem to be engaged in nothing more than creating one of those surveys which dominate the internet. Interesting and fun, and maybe there is even some decent social science there. They certainly tell us nothing about philosophy or Kant, though.
24
The thought experiment is a mess and the authors have chosen a Strawman version of Kant's argument. The underlying principle is that you ought not to deceive your friend, and you had the option to not poke holes in the gas tank. Once the car has been been sabotaged, you have already breached your duty; but you had the capacity to refrain from doing so. Similarly the duty to avoid murder is not a requirement that you bring someone back to life after you have intentionally shot him, it is a duty to refrain from shooting him in the first place.
2
Kant was talking about free will when he said "ought" implies "can." I'm not sure he would have recognized these experiments as having anything to do with his views on free will.
1
The application of Kantian principles is often controversial, always difficult but rigorously following his distinctions and concepts helps a great deal. A popular poll with an abstruse example does not.
I don't see a sharp can't. Even if her car broke down, she, for instance, could get a taxi and still get you to the airport, thus fulfilling her promise. Why is this experiment then a refusal of Kant?
1
I thought the point of moral philosophy was to tell us what we ought to do, not what we think is easiest to do, and thus are most likely to choose as "right."
Either way,friend ought to call a tow truck AND a cab to get her "friend" to the airport.
And remember, the sun doesn't revolve around the earth, though everyone once agreed it be so. And slavery is still alive and well.
Actual human behavior and belief should never inform philosophy.
Either way,friend ought to call a tow truck AND a cab to get her "friend" to the airport.
And remember, the sun doesn't revolve around the earth, though everyone once agreed it be so. And slavery is still alive and well.
Actual human behavior and belief should never inform philosophy.
1
The guy needing to get the to the airport on time should be the on calling for a cab and that's what he should have done in the first place. This is philosophical gibberish, faulty in multiple ways, and poses a problem more akin to a situation comedy scenario than something in real life. If the guy was a real friend, he would not impose on her to ensure that he gets to the airport on time to get to an interview in which he is vying for the same job that she had previously interviewed for. The moral failure is on him.
1
to go a step further.
anyone who has done something very difficult, such a s run a marathon, knows that what one "can" do is not a discreet action. one finds out that there is much that one can do that one believes one can't do...until there is sufficient commitment, will power etc.
so under this view, our moral obligation to do what we ought to do is almost unbounded, simply because the bounds we draw for ourselves as to what we can do can be stretched. if we want to stretch hard ehough
anyone who has done something very difficult, such a s run a marathon, knows that what one "can" do is not a discreet action. one finds out that there is much that one can do that one believes one can't do...until there is sufficient commitment, will power etc.
so under this view, our moral obligation to do what we ought to do is almost unbounded, simply because the bounds we draw for ourselves as to what we can do can be stretched. if we want to stretch hard ehough
What could these authors possibly be saying? That because a majority of the respondents displayed sloppy thinking that said sloppy thinking must actually be right?
The whole point of rational philosophy was to avoid conclusions that “feel” right (the friend still has an obligation to drive the person, even though they can't...) in order to get to the conclusions that logic dictates must be right (saying that one is obligated to do something which is impossible for her to do is INCOHERENT because the very inability obviates the application of a moral frame).
Kant set out to think through ideas and concepts and their logical relationships in order to draw conclusions about what they can and can’t mean and what people can and can’t say about the world with any justification when they employ them.
Here, the friend is still morally responsible for the consequences of her sabotage. And, she may still be morally obligated to try to find some way to get the person to the airport (that depends on the original promise of transportation). But she can’t be obligated to drive an inoperable vehicle anymore than she can be obligated to fly the person there using her wings. The previous obligation simply went unfulfilled when she sabotaged the car.
Saying that people are obligated to do the impossible dilutes the concept of moral obligation itself. Defending and preserving such concepts was often the rational philosophers goal. It is a goal as worthy in our day as it was in Kant’s.
The whole point of rational philosophy was to avoid conclusions that “feel” right (the friend still has an obligation to drive the person, even though they can't...) in order to get to the conclusions that logic dictates must be right (saying that one is obligated to do something which is impossible for her to do is INCOHERENT because the very inability obviates the application of a moral frame).
Kant set out to think through ideas and concepts and their logical relationships in order to draw conclusions about what they can and can’t mean and what people can and can’t say about the world with any justification when they employ them.
Here, the friend is still morally responsible for the consequences of her sabotage. And, she may still be morally obligated to try to find some way to get the person to the airport (that depends on the original promise of transportation). But she can’t be obligated to drive an inoperable vehicle anymore than she can be obligated to fly the person there using her wings. The previous obligation simply went unfulfilled when she sabotaged the car.
Saying that people are obligated to do the impossible dilutes the concept of moral obligation itself. Defending and preserving such concepts was often the rational philosophers goal. It is a goal as worthy in our day as it was in Kant’s.
1
Hm, I thought of one other "ought" that might apply here. Perhaps the friend could call the prospective employer, and confess what she has done. Perhaps this would level the playing field again somewhat - in other words, she sabotaged her friend, now she can sabotage herself, in terms of her chances of getting the job, by causing the employer to look upon her unfavorably.
Of course, that could backfire - maybe the employer wants to hire the most aggressive person. This act might make her highly desirable in some employers' eyes ... then again, perhaps that makes it all right, if the job goes to the person best suited for it? Good luck to them both ...
Of course, that could backfire - maybe the employer wants to hire the most aggressive person. This act might make her highly desirable in some employers' eyes ... then again, perhaps that makes it all right, if the job goes to the person best suited for it? Good luck to them both ...
Not a convincing analysis. After she has punctured the gas tank and the car is stuck on the side of the road - assuming there is now no way for her to be able to get you to the airport - what might you mean if you said to her "You ought to take me to the airport"? I can't image. Of course, a more plausible claim would be "You ought to have taken me to the airport".
Does it make any sense to ask for assistance from my "friend" who punctures her gas tank to ensure that she cannot drive me to airport? Although I can think of many things that this so-called friend now "ought" to do, providing me with further assistance is definitely not very high on the list.
1
What the job applicant ought to have done is call a cab or taken the light rail thereby alleviating the poor woman with the broke down engine of any obligation regarding the applicant's need for transportation. She was probably late for picking up her kids at day care!
1
The idea that philosophy should be reduced to polling is not appealing.
Consider Socrates ethical question: is piety good a) because it is loved by the gods or b) do the gods love piety because it is good? All for a) raise their hands. All for b) raise their hands. Count the raised hands. OK it's settled.
On to ontology.
a) Were the pre-Socratics right to identify a thing (substance) underlying appearances or b) was Wittgenstein right to say that the world is made of facts, not of things? Raise your hands.
Consider Socrates ethical question: is piety good a) because it is loved by the gods or b) do the gods love piety because it is good? All for a) raise their hands. All for b) raise their hands. Count the raised hands. OK it's settled.
On to ontology.
a) Were the pre-Socratics right to identify a thing (substance) underlying appearances or b) was Wittgenstein right to say that the world is made of facts, not of things? Raise your hands.
1
Different questions are being answered, I think. In Kant's and the general public's considerations.
There is a major difference. I am just not educated and/or intelligent enough to identify it. Or at least I am not right now.
There is a major difference. I am just not educated and/or intelligent enough to identify it. Or at least I am not right now.
Maybe she punctured the gas tank just because she could.
Disappointment requires adequate planning.
Kant never argued that "ought" presupposes "can", on the contrary: "can" presupposes "ought". The whole point of Kants philosophy was to save moral judgements in a deterministic Newtonian universe. As a physical object we have no choice, there is no "can". Only as moral subjects able to process "oughts", a gap between what we do and what we should do emerges. It's not because you have a choice, that you can be blamed, but because you can be blamed, you have a choice.
14
The experiment means nothing. The "ought" and "can" problem remains even if your friend deliberately punctured her own tire. Her motive does not change the fact that she no longer can drive you to the airport. It only changes your sense of moral outrage.
The author is also guilty of an equivocation fallacy, because he is using the word "ought" in two different ways: in the Kantian sense, "ought" has to do with actual ability, but in the author's example of a deliberately punctured tire, "ought" has to do with human outrage and stubbornness, i.e. you did this on purpose, so you SHOULD still be on the hook for driving me.
Whatever the reason behind the punctured tired, the ought vs. can problem remains identical.
The feelings of your experiment participants are of no relevance to the question.
The author is also guilty of an equivocation fallacy, because he is using the word "ought" in two different ways: in the Kantian sense, "ought" has to do with actual ability, but in the author's example of a deliberately punctured tire, "ought" has to do with human outrage and stubbornness, i.e. you did this on purpose, so you SHOULD still be on the hook for driving me.
Whatever the reason behind the punctured tired, the ought vs. can problem remains identical.
The feelings of your experiment participants are of no relevance to the question.
17
"ought" involves personal judgment; "can" involves physical possibility.
Where they intersect temporally, they intertwine and become equivalencies.
But if they diverge, there is no connection except in the point of view of someone involved in the action originally.
Where they intersect temporally, they intertwine and become equivalencies.
But if they diverge, there is no connection except in the point of view of someone involved in the action originally.
4
Exactly.
In plain English (or in any language) if you tell me I ought to do something then you are implying that I can do it.
Nice try, but they do not intersect temporally. That's the thing.
I am rather surprised by the way the NY Times describes this article. The article does not provide data that implies Kant's claim is false. Kant's claim is a normative claim. The fact that people fail to agree with it does not have any implications regarding its truth or falsity. But let us be charitable and suppose the Times was implying that the data show that Kant and most philosophers are wrong in supposing that their intuitions about ought implies can are widely shared. This is a separate claim and has no bearing on the question of whether ought actually implies can. It is actually very hard to test though, because philosophers make careful distinctions about the time frames and the conditions under which judgments of obligation and ability are aligned. These distinctions are often not salient in the kinds of experiments described in the article. The experiments are important in assessing ways in which people make moral attributions under certain forced choice situations, but unless one is crass relativist, they say nothing about what moral theory one ought to hold.
37
The article is wrong, but so is this comment; the "ought implies can" principle is not a normative claim.
May I suggest looking at this using different language:
Your outcome is conditional on priors. You modified the priors, and you have a different outcome.
Our decision-making does not really follow mathematical logic. Rather, it follows a kind of bayesian probabilistic logic. I don't want to sound pedantic, but I do recommend Jaynes's Probability, the Logic of Science, edited and printed posthumously. Also Gopnik in Science, 2012.
Your outcome is conditional on priors. You modified the priors, and you have a different outcome.
Our decision-making does not really follow mathematical logic. Rather, it follows a kind of bayesian probabilistic logic. I don't want to sound pedantic, but I do recommend Jaynes's Probability, the Logic of Science, edited and printed posthumously. Also Gopnik in Science, 2012.
12
I learned in Jesuit school that the essence of morality is "don't harm the innocent gratituitously" I guess any controversy would be about who is innocent and what is gratituitous.I also learned it is a sin to lead others into temptation such as enticing your competitor to depend on your good will.
3
A different question: is it fair to allow a friend to undermine her own chance of getting a job she wants by assisting me in my effort to get that same job? By allowing her to assist me, I create a moral conflict for both of us. That's something that one ought not do. Perhaps I deserved to miss the interview.
11
So instant karma arrives on the scene -- is invoked -- to mop up what is left of the moral argument. A moral argument that in this case has failed. But it ought not to. Just because it can. Similarly, we ought not to resort to the deus ex machina of presumed "just desserts" which even in jest is nought but rationalization.
I found this thought experiment very hard to follow - is it the same friend? Or two different friends? If the same friend, then yes - I deserved to miss the interview! If different friends, then the one with the disabled vehicle should have called a taxi and offered to pay for it.
The author defines ought differently than Kant. That's all this is, just a case of semantic difference. Apparently 60% of people in a study agree with the author's definition. However, this is no way refutes any of Kant's work. Kant had a system with words that meant particular things. Included in that system is the definition of ought that implies can.
Is a car a car if it only has three wheels, or if it can't reverse, or if you need to power it with your feet like the Flintstones? It all depends on how you define cars. Arguing over definitions is philosophy's modern equivalent of counting angels on the head of a pin - a waste of time lacking any real insight.
Is a car a car if it only has three wheels, or if it can't reverse, or if you need to power it with your feet like the Flintstones? It all depends on how you define cars. Arguing over definitions is philosophy's modern equivalent of counting angels on the head of a pin - a waste of time lacking any real insight.
24
Shouldn't the driver - regardless of whether or not she intentionally disabled the car - simply pick up her cell phone and call a taxi (and pay for it) in order complete the obligation to her friend. The categorical imperative allows for no exceptions.
Shouldn't the German word "sollen" be translated as "should"?
Shouldn't the German word "sollen" be translated as "should"?
10
A thought experiment that requires imagining someone acting against her own self-interest—even in the interest of long-term gain—is flawed at the outset. The hypothetical woman-who-promised has set herself up for a lot of aggravation and expense on the assumption that the two of them are the only applicants for the job. This does not make sense.
6
It doesn't matter whether "can" is a precondition for "ought." What matters is whether the car can make it to the airport in time. Were he alive, Richard Rorty would be chuckling at this nonsense.
5
Why would you subject moral judgment to a survey? Obviously, your methodology is founded on a tautology -- if told to blame a scheming colleague who deliberately sabotages a "friend's" job hunt, one will do just that -- that has nothing to do with Kant's notion of moral imperative. Did the respondents even understand the question you were asking them? It's phrased as gibberish and has no relation whatsoever to Kant's position, which is prescriptive, that is, he was telling us how we should think about morality, not descriptive, as if he were making a guess as to how the majority of people in fact do address such issues in daily life. The whole "experiment" is idiotic.
Lesson: no, you can't "refute" Kant by asking a random assortment of surveyees to comment on a moral equation they do not grasp, as if you were conscripting ordinary folk to help you decide how to market corn flakes or toilet paper or a new discovery in astrophysics. Moral judgments cannot be evaluated in any meaningful way by so called "empirical" evidence.
Please do not even attempt to "replicate" this "experiment." There must be some better use for the academy's fragile intellectual and other resources. Thank you.
Lesson: no, you can't "refute" Kant by asking a random assortment of surveyees to comment on a moral equation they do not grasp, as if you were conscripting ordinary folk to help you decide how to market corn flakes or toilet paper or a new discovery in astrophysics. Moral judgments cannot be evaluated in any meaningful way by so called "empirical" evidence.
Please do not even attempt to "replicate" this "experiment." There must be some better use for the academy's fragile intellectual and other resources. Thank you.
15
Would now be a good time to remind our esteemed researchers that forty million Frenchmen can be wrong?
Their study shows how people *do* think, but the point of philosophy is to reveal how people *should* think. The fact that most people think incorrectly should come as no surprise to anyone in a philosophy department.
Their study shows how people *do* think, but the point of philosophy is to reveal how people *should* think. The fact that most people think incorrectly should come as no surprise to anyone in a philosophy department.
9
Ahh -- the difference between "moral philosophy" and "moral psychology" in a nutshell. "Moral philosophy" makes sense, but it doesn't actually reflect the world and the people who live in it. "Moral psychology" has insights to reality, but doesn't reflect the way the world should be.
I guess we'll just have to let each have its own sphere.
I guess we'll just have to let each have its own sphere.
8
If I were in this study I would've obviously have gone with the third option -- the friend ought to have called a cab.
4
Morally, the person needing to get to the airport should have called a cab himself rather than relying on his friend/competitor. He is the one of questionable morality for putting her in the awkward position of being supposedly responsible for getting to the airport on time when all along it was purely his responsibility regardless of any promises that she made.
1
The authors are dabbling in absurdity, not philosophy or even psychology. There is no relationship between “ought’ and “can” that they attribute to Kant, or to any sphere of morality. For Kant, the essence of the moral law was a good will and a self-developed sense of duty. All moral codes are aspirational – The Christian admonish to love your enemies is an ideal, one that people struggle with. Does the fact that they ought to try to accomplish this practice, mean they can? Hardly. Still they struggle. Introducing blame into this conversation is absurd. The authors betray their intent with the smug tone of their article. Yes, philosophy needs to take into account social science, but we can easily dispense with pseudo social science.
25
Thanks for this – you articulated the feelings I was unable to express regarding this frustrating article.
This is not an exercise in philosophy at all. It is merely an experiment in learned values. Amusing, but without substance.
9
OK, there is a conflict between philosophers and ordinary non-thinkers. Isn't one of the purposes of philosophy to challenge conventional notions?
4
Thank you for confirming the vulgarity of American culture: attempting to disprove Kant with an opinion poll. Because Gallup has more to say about ethics than Kant.
35
It is obviously typical sexist thinking on the part of male irony tower types to suggest that a woman would be so passive aggressive toward her friend as to cause herself hundreds of dollars in repair and towing charges by puncturing her wn gas tank. This would be an extremely dangerous act by the way, so it doesn't say much for their assessment of women's intelligence either. I have another thought experiment. The male friend ought to pay for the repairs and towing as it happened because of her act of kindness toward him.
5
Ought, should, can and other modals have two senses, one called epistemic, or the 'ability to do' sense, the other deontic, which is a reading of modals that concerns obligation. A failure to recognize these two senses of modals like ought leads to all sorts of confusion.
6
I think this article misses the point and does not refute Kant's position.
Kant was arguing that a virtuous action must, at the outset, be able to be performed. For instance, you should pull an unconscious man from a burning building if you are able to, but you can't be faulted for (have no obligation) to carry 20 men out single handedly. Perhaps you should return to pull another man out, if possible, and so on, until you are no longer able to (building collapses).
All these vignettes limit responses.
You ought to do something possible, and then you intentionally make it impossible, so you screwed up. You failed your responsibility. If given a range of choices, I suspect most people would say, well if it can be fixed, you still 'ought' to do it. Borrow a car. Pay for a cab. But if you really messed it up, so that it can no longer be done, it is incoherent to say you still ought to-- rather most people would say "well, you failed;" You violated your moral duty.
Repeat the experiment with an option
1. Person ought to do (the impossible x)
2. Person has already screwed up, and failed their obligation
And, I bet people will select #2; and Kant will live on for hundreds more years
Kant was arguing that a virtuous action must, at the outset, be able to be performed. For instance, you should pull an unconscious man from a burning building if you are able to, but you can't be faulted for (have no obligation) to carry 20 men out single handedly. Perhaps you should return to pull another man out, if possible, and so on, until you are no longer able to (building collapses).
All these vignettes limit responses.
You ought to do something possible, and then you intentionally make it impossible, so you screwed up. You failed your responsibility. If given a range of choices, I suspect most people would say, well if it can be fixed, you still 'ought' to do it. Borrow a car. Pay for a cab. But if you really messed it up, so that it can no longer be done, it is incoherent to say you still ought to-- rather most people would say "well, you failed;" You violated your moral duty.
Repeat the experiment with an option
1. Person ought to do (the impossible x)
2. Person has already screwed up, and failed their obligation
And, I bet people will select #2; and Kant will live on for hundreds more years
3
So is that what the philosophers are doing? Affirm a simple truth that most everyday folks know intuitively without reading pages after pages of Kant.
3
I think by "can" he means "should." And if, in the hypothetical instance, the gas tank of the friend competing for the same job is punctured, she certainly can't drive you to the airport.
And I don't see the "ought"/"can" (should?) dichotomy in Kant's "Do what you were doing as if it were a universal principle" foundation of morals.
This essay just seems all over the place
And I don't see the "ought"/"can" (should?) dichotomy in Kant's "Do what you were doing as if it were a universal principle" foundation of morals.
This essay just seems all over the place
4
I haven't read the study, but this report of the study suggests a fundamental misunderstanding of the "ought implies can" principle. Both "ought" and "can" statements involve temporal parameters. So, if one ought at at time t1 to do action at time t2, then one can at t1 do the action at t2. That principle is not refuted by the example of the lady and her gas tank. As with many of these experimental surveys, the results achieved depend upon how the questions are framed. If the temporal parameters were not made explicit in the survey's questions, then the results are unreliable.
3
This article provides an excellent explanation of why philosophy started its long slide into irrelevance when "natural philosophy" split into "science" and "philosophy."
3
Um duh. If ought is a moral term then it has nothing to do with ability. Otherwise we wouldn't be bothered in a situation where we want to help someone but lack the ability.
2
Since when does philosophy involve polling people?
If 60% of your poll indicate that they ought to kill political candidates, are you going to report that as moral?
This article was downright weird.
If 60% of your poll indicate that they ought to kill political candidates, are you going to report that as moral?
This article was downright weird.
8
The entire article relies on argumentum ad populum. People's opinion have little to do with wether moral judgment is correct or not.
Has this author even read philosophy?
Has this author even read philosophy?
12
This study seems to conflate "ought to do" with "ought to have done", yet these phrases have very different meanings.
1
Morality concern's one's own actions, not judging another's. Act with integrity and take responsibility for your decisions (even if you have misjudged another's ability to act responsibility) and all of this shame and blame disappear.
The person who deliberately sabotaged the interview is blameworthy and therefore ought to pay a price of some sort. The most apt price would be for her to drive her victim to the interview. She ought to do that. But she can’t do that, so she ought to do something else to remedy her wrong. There is no philosophical problem here.
Surveying undergraduate responses to a series of hypothetical anecdotes isn't science. Fun philosophy though!
1
This essay is the perfect explanation for why so many philosophers are unemployed and standing pathetically by the side of the road.
2
If I rephrased the my understanding of obligation of the gas tank puncturer, from literally driving her friend to the airport, to getting him there on time for his flight, she still CAN do something ( call Uber? ) to fulfill her obligation. And of course, when she made the "contract" she was entirely able to perform what she promised.
With the opening paragraph ( and title) , I was expecting something vastly different: perhaps something in the makeup of our brain, and beyond the control of our conscious mind, that would make some actions impossible to execute -- and open new philosophical territory.
With the opening paragraph ( and title) , I was expecting something vastly different: perhaps something in the makeup of our brain, and beyond the control of our conscious mind, that would make some actions impossible to execute -- and open new philosophical territory.
1
Well,I didn't get past the first paragraph! "The Imitation of Christ" discounted that premiss - flatly.
When I was a young man I read Born to Play Ball, Willie May's autobiography as told to Charles Einstein. He related a story of when he was playing way too shallow in centerfield and a ball was hit over his head. He ran furiously back, cap flying off his head, made a leaping catch and the crowd went wild. Afterwards, the left fielder came over and said, "You know Willie, you ought to have made that catch." And he said, I know.
Willie was one for whom ought equaled can.
Willie was one for whom ought equaled can.
1
What a waste of 'grey matter' calories.
3
The only real question is what happens when you say "ought" vs. what happens when you say "can".
C'mon, folks. We learned that a long time ago.
C'mon, folks. We learned that a long time ago.
1
Did I miss something? "Even when we say that someone has no obligation to keep a promise..., it seems we’re saying it not because she’s unable to do it, but because we don’t want to unfairly blame her for not keeping it." How are we to make sense of the word "unfairly" in that sentence except for that your friend... can't keep her promise? Doesn't her ability (in a broad sense which includes her ability to refrain from puncturing her own tire as opposed to an accident) to keep her promise determine whether or not the blame is fair? Blame is fair in the one case because she could have refrained from puncturing her own tires whereas she couldn't refrain from having accidentally, say, run over a nail. And doesn't that bring us back to Kant, or am I missing something?
17
Philosophers and their semantics, what fun! Reminds me of the countless hours misspent, in my youth, discussing the magically appearing and disappearing subject of the sentence: "There are cookies on the table if you're hungry."
How about this? If you have a friend who would dangerously sabotage you, maybe you ought to reconsider your friendship? Or, maybe you ought to just take a cab to the airport like a normal person? Ought means can, ftw!
How about this? If you have a friend who would dangerously sabotage you, maybe you ought to reconsider your friendship? Or, maybe you ought to just take a cab to the airport like a normal person? Ought means can, ftw!
3
Seems like just hair splitting. Of course she should have driven her friend to the airport; no moral scheme I can think of allows you to deliberately sabotage yourself from performing the right ethical action, then declare yourself blameless because you "can't" do it.
It's really hard to believe this sort of thing gets people excited.
It's really hard to believe this sort of thing gets people excited.
1
She acted immorally when she said she would take her friend to the airport and planned to sabotage him instead. I am not a philosopher so I don’t know if Kant was making an argument about human behavior or about morality. Kant says you can't blame her if she intended to take her friend to the airport and couldn't. If she never intended to take him then you’re changing the moral question. Her obligation can’t exceed here abilities if she intentionally disables the car. What is the point of making a moral judgment about not taking him to the airport after she punctures the gas tank? Shouldn't you make the moral judgment about her puncturing the tank? She lied when she said she would drive him to the airport, she never intended him to get to the airport and further she made it so no one else could get him there either. She acted immorally from the get go. The philosophers are right because your hypothetical is wrong.
If your subjects blame her when the car breaks down accidentally, then again you and they are wrong unless you believe that moral truth should be put to a vote. Was Kant telling us how people think about moral obligations or was he telling us how we ought to think about moral obligations, if the former than maybe you are on to something if the latter your study is irrelevant.
If your subjects blame her when the car breaks down accidentally, then again you and they are wrong unless you believe that moral truth should be put to a vote. Was Kant telling us how people think about moral obligations or was he telling us how we ought to think about moral obligations, if the former than maybe you are on to something if the latter your study is irrelevant.
35
There is too much word play here, from the beginning, and the discussion reflects what is going on in too much of contemporary discussion, philosophical or otherwise. “Blame” is an arbitrary concept thrown in to produce a predisposed result the writer wants to show. He does not state his major premises, at least one of which is that you can’t avoid a universal obligation by creating a way to avoid it.
However, in dealing with moral or ethical principles - we don’t need to get into a discussion of differences between moral and ethical - the “ought” here must mean a “goal” or a “standard” - something that is desirable or part of a set of good objectives by which we should live. No philosophy would be worth its salt if it postulated a set of goals we could not possibly achieve, no matter how hard we tried. The concept should not be bent to reflect more than that.
However, in dealing with moral or ethical principles - we don’t need to get into a discussion of differences between moral and ethical - the “ought” here must mean a “goal” or a “standard” - something that is desirable or part of a set of good objectives by which we should live. No philosophy would be worth its salt if it postulated a set of goals we could not possibly achieve, no matter how hard we tried. The concept should not be bent to reflect more than that.
TRY AGAIN
It shows Kant´s greatness that more than two centuries after his death empirical psychologists pick fights with him. But they are completely off the mark, as philosophical and moral thinking is not a domain that can be brushed off on mere empirical grounds. Philosophy is a complex endeavor like art. Framing psychological experiments can neither confirm nor infirm Kant´s thought. The two authors should try to argue with Kant on philosophical grounds, not by marshalling data. Kant lives, this kind of empirical thought dies with the article.
It shows Kant´s greatness that more than two centuries after his death empirical psychologists pick fights with him. But they are completely off the mark, as philosophical and moral thinking is not a domain that can be brushed off on mere empirical grounds. Philosophy is a complex endeavor like art. Framing psychological experiments can neither confirm nor infirm Kant´s thought. The two authors should try to argue with Kant on philosophical grounds, not by marshalling data. Kant lives, this kind of empirical thought dies with the article.
2
Take a cab! Oh, call Uber.
1
Just use Uber to get you to the airport.
Um... Uber?
The "ought" argument presented in the first paragraph ("It would be absurd to suggest that we should do what we couldn't possibly do") is not the same argument against which the writers are protesting. As stated, the absurdity is in expecting someone to do something which is ABSOLUTELY beyond his or her ability ("couldn't possibly do.") The authors are arguing against an expection of RELATIVE inability; i.e., the friend was able and willing, but has intentionally made himself unable.
Thus the source of the inability (innate or manufactured?) becomes the basis for judgment; "blame" is merely a by-product, arising from the moral compass of an observer.
Thus the source of the inability (innate or manufactured?) becomes the basis for judgment; "blame" is merely a by-product, arising from the moral compass of an observer.
3
Um no…ought implies can in the sense that the ‘can’ is entailed by ought. This is most easily illustrated by a simple example with two options:
I am walking down the street, holding an empty water bottle. I can wait to throw it in the recycling, or throw it on the ground (for simplicity sake, let’s assume these are the only two options). The can plays a role in that both of these options are available to me, I CAN do either of them. Both are physically viable. The ought, if ones deontology suggests recycling is a good, is that we OUGHT to throw it away.
If we have a scenario where we have a CAN’T, then there is no initial OUGHT to which it could have arisen. The example about puncturing the gas tank missteps by attributing the OUGHT to ‘driving friend to airport’, instead of other places which could have implied CAN (ought not to puncture gas tank, if punctured gas tank, ought to make arrangments and make up for act of sabotage, etc…).
I was hoping this article was going to say something more philosophical about the nature of ‘CAN’ and whether or not we ‘CAN’ do anything. Having two ‘options’ may just be an illusion some determinists may suggest. But sadly it wasn’t, and hence the post.
I am walking down the street, holding an empty water bottle. I can wait to throw it in the recycling, or throw it on the ground (for simplicity sake, let’s assume these are the only two options). The can plays a role in that both of these options are available to me, I CAN do either of them. Both are physically viable. The ought, if ones deontology suggests recycling is a good, is that we OUGHT to throw it away.
If we have a scenario where we have a CAN’T, then there is no initial OUGHT to which it could have arisen. The example about puncturing the gas tank missteps by attributing the OUGHT to ‘driving friend to airport’, instead of other places which could have implied CAN (ought not to puncture gas tank, if punctured gas tank, ought to make arrangments and make up for act of sabotage, etc…).
I was hoping this article was going to say something more philosophical about the nature of ‘CAN’ and whether or not we ‘CAN’ do anything. Having two ‘options’ may just be an illusion some determinists may suggest. But sadly it wasn’t, and hence the post.
3
The person who NEEDS to get to the airport is responsible for ensuring that he can. He is he person who OUGHT to get to the airport.
2
Jeez.... This arcane philosophical debate reminds me of the medieval one about how many angels could dance on head of a pin! Is this Nature's Way of telling you that you have way too much time on your hands??
In a world in which there are so many more pressing and tangible and relevant problems to solve, this seems the merest intellectual masturbation!
As a psychotherapist, I am frequently called upon to help my clients wrestle with moral and philosophical questions, but we do so in the CONTEXT of a specific life, in a specific time and place and occupation and socioeconomic reality and marital and family status!
When you wrestle with such questions WITHOUT all the specifics that make us each unique, you're back to angels on the head of a pin! We do not lead hypothetical lives. No WONDER philosophy departments are dying--until the rubber meets the road, it's just so much hot air.
I agree: Philosophers ought to pay more attention to their colleagues in the psychology department...and learn to help REAL people deal with REAL problems. They OUGHT to quit fiddling while Rome burns....
In a world in which there are so many more pressing and tangible and relevant problems to solve, this seems the merest intellectual masturbation!
As a psychotherapist, I am frequently called upon to help my clients wrestle with moral and philosophical questions, but we do so in the CONTEXT of a specific life, in a specific time and place and occupation and socioeconomic reality and marital and family status!
When you wrestle with such questions WITHOUT all the specifics that make us each unique, you're back to angels on the head of a pin! We do not lead hypothetical lives. No WONDER philosophy departments are dying--until the rubber meets the road, it's just so much hot air.
I agree: Philosophers ought to pay more attention to their colleagues in the psychology department...and learn to help REAL people deal with REAL problems. They OUGHT to quit fiddling while Rome burns....
4
How is this empirical evidence? It is possible for 100% of the participants to be wrong. Im not a philosopher or a psychologist - but it seems the social science approach is fundamentally irrational. just because there is a statistical majority who agree does't prove something to be a fact. Often times we agree on things that turn out to be false. And anyways i disagree, even if my friend is sabotaging herself to make it so she can't, it is not unethical that she does not help ... Because well, she can't. Sabotaging herself is unethical because it will put her in a situation where she can't - but the self sabotage is a separate action from helping me so it is a different ethical violation. She may be able to find another way to get me to the airport even after she self sabotages - for example she could rent a car or ask one of her friends to help by driving. If she still can she still ought to; but if she can't then it's neither her fault nor is it wrong.
I’m not convinced. The belief that my friend still “ought” to give me a ride is true only insofar as she still “ought” to be a friend – that is, somebody who will act to help support my own interests. When she proves herself to be something other than a friend, a saboteur in fact, the relationship changes and with it so should our understanding of what “ought” or “ought not” to be. This study may not make a strong case against Kant, but it does reveal the delay—or downright inability—for many people to change their understanding of what “ought” to be or what “ought not” to be, even when the assumptions upon which that understanding is constructed radically change. (Perhaps that’s why it’s more difficult for older people to shake off outdated beliefs about society and culture?) I think most people would agree that a friend who says she will give you a much needed ride ought to follow through, but a proven saboteur ought not. I wonder if people’s responses would change if the word “friend” was replaced in the question with “saboteur” once it’s revealed that she punctures her own gas tank. What if participants were given more time to think about their answer before responding? What if they were able to discuss the question with others before responding? What if they were asked to think about what might happen if the saboteur/friend actually did manage to find another car and offer that very important ride? Heaven forbid there’s a gun in the glove compartment.
1
Much ado about nothing
Words
Words
Or "ought" is the goal and how to get there in time and space is the real issue in life.
I "ought" to loose the extra seven pounds by daily eating differently just as I "ought" to keep my obligations to friends or just not promise what might not work out. Personally, I call taxis to the airport to spare friends and myself unfortunate moral uncertainties.
I "ought" to loose the extra seven pounds by daily eating differently just as I "ought" to keep my obligations to friends or just not promise what might not work out. Personally, I call taxis to the airport to spare friends and myself unfortunate moral uncertainties.
3
Yet another example of how and why western philosophy is completely disconnected from any reality. Still in it's earliest formation, like a toddler demanding attention- it's absurdities are easily dismissed. In a thousand years, when western philosophy has caught up with eastern thought, then there will be something to talk about.
2
A bit harsh I would say and I would also say that the exaggerated notion of the vast superiority of Eastern thought is juvenile. However. I happen to agree that most noted Western philosophers waste a whole lot of time, energy and thought on ridiculous mental meanderings. This is one such.
1
I can't quite make up my mind, is this bad science, bad philosophy or both?
1. Bad science: "But with stories in which the inability to help was accidental, the obligation all but disappeared. Now, only 31 percent of our participants said your friend still ought to drive you."
31% is not "all but disappeared". If one had a 31% chance of relapse of a cancer, the cancer did not "all but disappeared," one would still live very much in the shadow of cancer. So the ought-as-can view did not "all but disappear" in the case of accidents but still exerts a significant force. How much? 31%!
2. Bad philosophy: Philosophy is not about polling, it isn't the Iowa caucuses or the New Hampshire primary, where a bunch of people favor Trump and Trumpian philosophy now trumps all other moral philosophy. By God, building a wall IS philosophically correct, 31% of Iowans say so.
3. Both bad science and bad philosophy: Take a poll, throw around some numbers, cite a philosopher, so that is experimental philosophy? Moral philosophy is about what "ought" to be not what "is".
1. Bad science: "But with stories in which the inability to help was accidental, the obligation all but disappeared. Now, only 31 percent of our participants said your friend still ought to drive you."
31% is not "all but disappeared". If one had a 31% chance of relapse of a cancer, the cancer did not "all but disappeared," one would still live very much in the shadow of cancer. So the ought-as-can view did not "all but disappear" in the case of accidents but still exerts a significant force. How much? 31%!
2. Bad philosophy: Philosophy is not about polling, it isn't the Iowa caucuses or the New Hampshire primary, where a bunch of people favor Trump and Trumpian philosophy now trumps all other moral philosophy. By God, building a wall IS philosophically correct, 31% of Iowans say so.
3. Both bad science and bad philosophy: Take a poll, throw around some numbers, cite a philosopher, so that is experimental philosophy? Moral philosophy is about what "ought" to be not what "is".
6
This essay misunderstands ethics. Yes, yes to those who've pointed out that blame or self-recrimination is not the basis for determining whether there is a genuinely "ought" at stake. How many of us have felt guilty when we hurt an acquaintance's feelings when we tell them, truthfully, that we don't reciprocate their feelings for us, or we can't go to their party, or we don't think they're doing a good job, when we say they're drinking too much, that our kids can't go to a certain party, etc.? Feeling guilty or blameworthy is not always a sign of moral wrong-doing. Sometimes we blame ourselves for doing the right thing or things that are beyond our control (especially when those events causes hurt to others).
The woman in question should blame herself about the actions leading up to the incident; the subsequent blame, as viewed by the study participants, is likely as anything, as another commenter suggested, a residue of the earlier, bad moral choices she made.
The woman in question should blame herself about the actions leading up to the incident; the subsequent blame, as viewed by the study participants, is likely as anything, as another commenter suggested, a residue of the earlier, bad moral choices she made.
Perhaps the "ought" should be applied to the individual who asked for a ride to the airport from someone who is her competitor for the job? She ought not put someone in such an awkward position to begin with? I have often been in a situation where I say, yes, to a friends request, but, privately, state a friend should not have put me into such a position.
Not that I subscribe to it, but I would like to point out that in much of Western Christianity, ought does not equal can. This whole issue came up in the controversy between Pelagius and Augustine. Augustine won that battle, and from that point on the orthodox opinion was that man's nature is so corrupted by the Fall that he is unable to do what he ought to do on his own abilities. Rather, he needs divine intervention, which Christians call Grace. Pelagianism always creeps back in, but orthodox opinion has always rejected it. I am gathering the author of this piece is unfamiliar with Calvanism, which was once quite dominant in Protestant thought.
Seems to me the experiment turns on an argumentum ad populem: taking the measure on a piece of opinion carries no more weight of truth than "2 million cola drinkers can't be wrong!". But I also agree with the opinions below-- in conceiving the inquiry, let alone constructing it, the investigators have tried to be so smart they have become foolish.
5
A classic example of getting the wrong answer to the wrong question. The issue is not whether one ought if one can. The question is wether one should (a "moral" question) puncture one 's own gas tank. Asking whether one should then be obliged to still drive the friend to the airport is adding an additional layer that obsfucate the real question.
3
Firstly, philosophy is empirical and for good reason! "Ought" does indeed imply "can" but its clear to see that in the case where the person purposefully disabled the car there was a proximal chain of events where the moral culpability follows from the initial misdeed, disabling the car. In either case ought and blame are intimately related. This article misses the point, one ought to do what one ought to do when one can do it. When one can not it doesn't matter. Its clear that the blame causes from a different ought: that one ought not manufacture a situation to avoid doing what you ought to do.
6
Making material representations that one is both equipped and intending to fulfill [perform] a duty, favor, or other obligation implies that the person doing so can, in fact, perform.
After agreeing to drive a friend to the airport for such an important reason, the driver in the thought experiment, upon learning that the condition of her vehicle would not allow her to perform, could still have acknowledged the obligation and contracted for a cab, shuttle, or Uber on her friend's behalf.
In an entirely different context, computer software consulting, contractors and consultants often interview for and discuss requirements of specific assignments. If they are later determined as unequal to the tasks they have contracted to perform, they can be held liable for errors, omissions, etc. (unless such have been otherwise discounted by the language of their contract).
In these scenaria "ought" indeed equals "can" because the would-be actor has already purported and/or attested to an ability to perform.
After agreeing to drive a friend to the airport for such an important reason, the driver in the thought experiment, upon learning that the condition of her vehicle would not allow her to perform, could still have acknowledged the obligation and contracted for a cab, shuttle, or Uber on her friend's behalf.
In an entirely different context, computer software consulting, contractors and consultants often interview for and discuss requirements of specific assignments. If they are later determined as unequal to the tasks they have contracted to perform, they can be held liable for errors, omissions, etc. (unless such have been otherwise discounted by the language of their contract).
In these scenaria "ought" indeed equals "can" because the would-be actor has already purported and/or attested to an ability to perform.
2
Social science is no more a science than is political science. Because social science rests entirely upon race, color, faith, gender, national origin, economics and history plus arithmetic there are way too many variables and unknowns to make any credible repeatable predictions with adequate controls. Evolutionary biology based upon genetic DNA natural selection by behavior, anatomy and physiology plus mathematics is science.
4
If your personal definition of "science" varies from the common definition, that's not a philosophical analysis, it's mere pedantics.
Must, Ought, Can, Should, those are the meaty words that we debate, what does each word actually mean, especially when translated into different languages. Those are the challenging concepts. I'd call it philosophy or ethics, but try to get a fifth grader excited about studying Ethics, and try to get a Republican dominated school board to fund a class in Philosophy.
Certainly, that is the reason conservatives traditionally oppose instruction in those topics that illuminate the moral flaws of their basic principals, which are based on catchy slogans like "pull yourself up by your bootstraps" and "no tax dollars for birth control".
Must, Ought, Can, Should, those are the meaty words that we debate, what does each word actually mean, especially when translated into different languages. Those are the challenging concepts. I'd call it philosophy or ethics, but try to get a fifth grader excited about studying Ethics, and try to get a Republican dominated school board to fund a class in Philosophy.
Certainly, that is the reason conservatives traditionally oppose instruction in those topics that illuminate the moral flaws of their basic principals, which are based on catchy slogans like "pull yourself up by your bootstraps" and "no tax dollars for birth control".
It is worth noting that the Christian conception of ought and can forms a strong backdrop to this discussion in western societies. Christian theology has a subtle distinction between our capability to do right and the certainty of failure to do right. "For all have sinned". The Christian notion of a perfect world before sin grounds a belief that the ought is possible, but after the fall into sin it is no longer possible to live up to the standard of ought.
1
Unfortunately the authors misrepresent Kant when they claim that in his thought obligation implies ability. "You can because you must" was his way of insisting that obligation is prior to ability, which is very different from claiming moral obligation to be circumscribed by what we can or cannot achieve at any given time. Our obligation to follow the law stems from our nature as beings capable of reason. That obligation is independent of individual inclination or circumstance. If something is the right thing to do it will be the right thing regardless of limitations in the physical world.
11
So all we are really saying is that ought implies could have, rather than can't. I think I am missing the revelation here. Perhaps I need to brush up on my Kant, but my suspicion upon reading this is that the presentation of Kant's position (along with the supposed "virtual unanimity" of philosophers in general), is probably oversimplified and something of a dummy argument. And Kant and that school is so passé! Everyone knows Nietzsche revealed Kant's moral philosophy as an absurd attempt to rationalize the very inversion of values...."there are even cases in which morality has been able to turn the critical will against itself, so that, like the scorpion, it drives its sting into its own body." - Daybreak, Nietzsche, 1866.
The authors mistake the task of philosophy. It is not to record what people happen to think, but to help them think more clearly. The intuition that the saboteur still ought to drive you to the airport when he can't is simply confused. It would be more accurate to say that he ought to have driven you to the airport instead of reneging on his obligation by sabotaging his car. That is, he ought not to have sabotaged his car because he had the ability (choice) not to have done so. In any case, the claim that ought implies can was never intended as an empirical generalization based upon what a percentage of people above a certain threshold just happens to believe. It is a logically necessity that I cannot be obligated to do what i cannot do. To deliberately put myself in the position of not being able to do it in no way threatens the truth of of that statement.
regardless of whether experiments are done or not, philosophy is not a science because it does not meet the requirements for a science that is used in studying neutral phenomena. (neither does psychology for that matter or economics. no study of human behavior, however interesting it might be, qualifies as being a science..
1
So there are no falsifiable statements possible in the study of human behavior? Once you have decided what to study you give up neutrality so there is no science. Neutrality is not the issue.
Why not think that we never have an obligation to do exactly the thing we're unable to, but rather that when we play a causal role in some set of unfortunate circumstances, we ought to fix things, or at least try to. Say my friend pops a hole in her tire and we're not able to get to the airport. Does she really have an obligation to drive me to the airport in her car? No, but she does have an obligation to get me to the airport. "Ought" still implies "can". It is an interesting point, though, that moral responsibility is baked into the concept of obligation.
Please remember that anyone who drives with a punctured gas tank is risking the inferno. If the car burns, both will die and neither will get the job. People ought not modify personal property so as to make catastrophic events possible. (Cf Ralph Nader, Unsafe at Any Speed)
1
Well, if a proposition in "moral philosophy" is proven or disproven by the responses of people in, essentially, focus groups to hypothetical scenarios, how is "moral philosophy" different from experimental anthropology looking at a given society's mores? If "morality" is socially determined--which I tend to think it is--then it isn't what ordinary people, or focus group members, think of as "morality" at all. We can all take a vote on what's "moral," but that doesn't really tell us anything we didn't think we knew already.
1
Several commentators have pointed out the general point, that Kant was developing a critical and ideal projection of rational nature.
A little more familiarity with the history of philosophy would let one in on the fact that Kant was a devout Christian. That real human beings would not, in fact, be able to measure up to their own ideal form, is in complete keeping with the idea that humanity is fallen, and cannot be saved by works -- ie, cannot actually fulfill the moral law -- and hence the need for immortality, the soul, and religion.
It is a shame to mislead readers so. The entire thesis of the essay rather falls apart, if you put in a simplified caricature of Kant (and philosophy!) as your starting point.
I believe the philosophers call that a straw man fallacy.
A little more familiarity with the history of philosophy would let one in on the fact that Kant was a devout Christian. That real human beings would not, in fact, be able to measure up to their own ideal form, is in complete keeping with the idea that humanity is fallen, and cannot be saved by works -- ie, cannot actually fulfill the moral law -- and hence the need for immortality, the soul, and religion.
It is a shame to mislead readers so. The entire thesis of the essay rather falls apart, if you put in a simplified caricature of Kant (and philosophy!) as your starting point.
I believe the philosophers call that a straw man fallacy.
3
Often, we say we "can't" do something, but "can't" is not quite accurate. Suppose your friend promised to drive you to the airport, but then her child got sick and had to be taken hospital. So, she "couldn't" drive you to the airport. But actually, she can, at the now tremendous personal cost of not taking her child to the hospital. Ought she to drive you to the airport? Most people would probably say no, she ought not, even though she had promised. In this way, many real-world "can't"s are because the cost of doing what one has promised, what one ought to do, has increased tremendously and unexpectedly. This is a different, but possibly more common and relevant, situation than the situation where the task is truly impossible (say, traveling to the center of the sun). But when the unexpected cost becomes high enough, the difference between the situations seems to shrink.
1
Philosophical conclusions are not decided by majority rule. Thank goodness!
It is ridiculous to use the present tense to describe what someone "ought do" when that action is not doable.
There's nothing wrong, however, with asserting what that person "ought to have done" if the appropriate action was doable in the past.
That's the only version that makes any sense.
It is ridiculous to use the present tense to describe what someone "ought do" when that action is not doable.
There's nothing wrong, however, with asserting what that person "ought to have done" if the appropriate action was doable in the past.
That's the only version that makes any sense.
1
I agree. Nemo tenetur ad impossibile (no one is obliged to do the impossible). It is self evident. Ought does not imply can; The ought is there whether you can or cannot. But if you can not, the ought does not bind you. You are free of blame for not performing.
Another way to put the problem with this argument: It misunderstands inability. To be unable to perform an act does not mean simply that at some point in time in the process the action is impossible. It must mean that the act was impossible when the subject made a good faith effort to complete it. Puncturing one's own tire means the act was indeed possible and you chose to not complete it. Your definition of "can" is faulty.
2
Not only is there no connection between obligation and ability. It is in the very nature of moral obligation that we cannot fulfill it. It is in the very nature of moral obligation, as opposed to conditional obligations (If you want to live, you have to eat) to be absolved of any conditions. If there is no such obligation, then all such talks is merely politics. I am responsible to and for every human being. If I were not, I would feel no obligation to those poor Syrian refugees, about which I can do nothing at the moment. To be human is to recognize my inherent responsibility to every human I encounter, and it is, from the start, impossible to "satisfy" those obligations. So I calculate the best use of my limited assets over those multiple obligations. That calculation is what we call justice. It is, in fact, this inexhaustible moral obligation that gives me meaning.
It is a grave mistake, made all too often these days, to confuse the functions of philosophy and psychology. I am afraid that is what has happened here.
It is a grave mistake, made all too often these days, to confuse the functions of philosophy and psychology. I am afraid that is what has happened here.
2
The case in question is flawed because the circumstances changed when the intent changed. Offering the ride with the intent of puncturing your own gas tank is the unethical act. Viewed in the light of Kant's categorical imperative to act if the act were to be a standard for all future action, she would subsequently need to be concerned she had set the stage for others the behave similarly in similar situations. In short, if she needed a ride in the future would she consider any car breakdown as suspicions?
The first case she had no part in making the car break down. This is not an ethical issue. This is outside of the purview of ethics. She wasn't obligated to do something she can't physically do.
If there is no blame there is no shame.
The causation should be reversed. If you can, you ought. If she can help her friend, so ought to help him. If she does so despite the potential harm to herself, this is an act with ethical content. I believe this would fit Schopehauer's philosophical stance.
The first case she had no part in making the car break down. This is not an ethical issue. This is outside of the purview of ethics. She wasn't obligated to do something she can't physically do.
If there is no blame there is no shame.
The causation should be reversed. If you can, you ought. If she can help her friend, so ought to help him. If she does so despite the potential harm to herself, this is an act with ethical content. I believe this would fit Schopehauer's philosophical stance.
7
One problem with this line of thought is that the experimenters deliberately (or by lack of analysis) over-simplified the situation. It isn't binary -- if the driver didn't maintain her car and it broke down as a direct result of lack of maintenance, there is more blame. Further, if she not only didn't maintain her car, but hid that fact from her friend, thereby giving her friend a biased view of the likelihood of her being able to drive him to the airport, there is even more blame.
So, a further dimension of the problem is the match between expectation on the part of the friend and the validity of that expectation.
Messy...
So, a further dimension of the problem is the match between expectation on the part of the friend and the validity of that expectation.
Messy...
1
I love philosophy, but find in it mostly nonsense, statements of the obvious or obviously wrong. I read it endlessly, but don't take any of it too seriously and use from it only what I find valuable here and there, more often about what we can't know.
I don't find Kant that helpful and have always considered ought/can more philosophical fluff. Nor, really, do I think these experiments prove much of anything. If I had to pick one philosopher, It's Hume, who, though of course fallible, led the way for modern thinking, inspired Kant himself, James, Mills, Schopenauer, and more importantly, Adam Smith, Darwin and Einstein, among many others. My opinion, of course, but that's all most of it is - opinion.
I don't find Kant that helpful and have always considered ought/can more philosophical fluff. Nor, really, do I think these experiments prove much of anything. If I had to pick one philosopher, It's Hume, who, though of course fallible, led the way for modern thinking, inspired Kant himself, James, Mills, Schopenauer, and more importantly, Adam Smith, Darwin and Einstein, among many others. My opinion, of course, but that's all most of it is - opinion.
5
You have a cell phone. Call an Uber or a taxi. In addition, punching a hole in your own vehicle is stupid, costly to repair, and potentially dangerous. I fail to see what any of these types of "thought experiments" can contribute to the teaching of ethical behavior. It's really a follow up of. "angels on the head of a pin".
I'd rather read Richard Feynman. He had a great deal to say about Physics and a few interesting comments on philosophy.
I'd rather read Richard Feynman. He had a great deal to say about Physics and a few interesting comments on philosophy.
1
Pragmatism encroaches upon epistemology from many directions. Theology is one of them. Moral philosophy is another. To be useful, these subsets must write prescriptions for those who use them. St. Thomas Aquinas proposed that it is ethical to act, even if harm might occur, if that harm was not the primary effect of the act, and if the harm could reasonably be expected not to occur. Hence, a surgeon can ethically perform a hip replacement to relieve someone's pain, knowing that 3 in 1000 people die after such procedures. Yet Dr. Kevorkian would be hard put to defend injection with a syringe that had a 3/1000 chance of holding a lethal chemical. Meanwhile, instead of fostering mass transportation, legislators facilitate highway constructions, car manufacturing processes, and oil refining products with the certainty that almost 40,000 Americans will be killed every year in motor vehicle accidents. The semi-justification is that they do not know exactly which people will die, and that it is economically too costly to do otherwise. Studies of the social aspects of individual decision making in the context of morality are relevant on one level, but decision making rules for the individual are clearly not applicable on the larger scale. We need, instead, philosophical studies to give our governmental functionaries a basis to perform what they do with ethical and moral guidance. Every election makes it clearer that they need it.
What psychologists call "evidence" is what philosophers might call "hubris." This is an arrogantly stupid article. Here is how it works: first, study an argument by a philosopher of standing, out of context. Then find out what a cohort of undergraduates, with little preparation in moral philosophy, think. Finally, decide that the undergraduates, differing from the philosopher, are right -- because, well why? Because there are more undergraduates then the single philosopher? These so called psychologist begin with the assumption that philosophical questions about ethics can be decided empirically -- which is precisely the point that Kant said was technically impossible. Well done. In other words, having decided that Kant was wrong, the experimenters developed an experiment whose only outcome could be to prove him wrong.
3
"Arrogantly stupid" nails it. It's depressing to watch people with PhDs in one science unquestioningly presume that they are qualified, as certified geniuses apparently, to dabble in another. It's true that philosophers have a hard time coming to consensus, in contrast with the other sciences (another issue famously tackled by Kant in Critique of Pure Reason), but just about any serious student of philosophy would groan in despair at the highway robbery that passes as logic in this article. The authors are really no different than the uninitiated common person, whose "common sense" casually assures them that philosophy and philosophers are ridiculous without needing to think any further on the matter.
1
I very much agree with your first sentence. If they were interested in what constitutes true scientific evidence, an introduction to Achinstein would well serve the authors of this article.
In your last sentence, if you are using the word experiment in its scientific sense, then I very much disagree with it. This is not an experiment. It is a survey. Surveys have their purpose, but they are not experiments.
In your last sentence, if you are using the word experiment in its scientific sense, then I very much disagree with it. This is not an experiment. It is a survey. Surveys have their purpose, but they are not experiments.
The logic is bad in this article. Ought implies can, says Kant, according to the authors. The authors then state that Sinnott-Armstrong (and later, themselves) show that "obligation" does not mean "can" according to the understanding of actual subjects (who, the authors seem to forget, are human beings and not necessarily given to being logical or philosophical in their judgments). By changing the wording from "ought" to "obligation" (which can, as they tacitly assert, essentially mean the same thing), the authors simply blur the logical mistake being made, so that we don't notice it right away. Preserving the same language in both hypotheses, Kant (allegedly) says "ought implies can." Sinnot-Armstrong and authors say "ought to have in the past" does not imply "can in the present/future." Of course, they are correct, but their statement does not contradict the one attributed to Kant. If the use of Kant and philosophy in this article was only rhetorical, intended to make a scientific article cute or interesting for laypeople, it wouldn't be worth correcting them. But, as the whole point of their experiment seems to be attached to a logical misunderstanding of philosophy, I wonder what their experiment shows, if anything.
1
I change my mind. I think this article IS a thought experiment.
This report doesn't provide serious evidence against Kant. The question posed doesn't provide for alternative remedies, and therefore, doesn't appreciate the psychological push to choose the only option presented even if it isn't physically possible.
It would be a better test if the respondents were given multiple options, such as would the person who sabotaged the car have a stronger obligation to (1) withdraw his/her candidacy, or (2) arrange by cell phone for someone else to drive the person to the job interview. There could certainly be additional remedies. My guess is that the respondents would choose one of these alternatives to stating flat out that they had an obligation to drive the person to the interview. Clearly, the saboteur has an obligation to do something, and it would clearly be in the interest of the victim that that something involve a real possibility.
It would be a better test if the respondents were given multiple options, such as would the person who sabotaged the car have a stronger obligation to (1) withdraw his/her candidacy, or (2) arrange by cell phone for someone else to drive the person to the job interview. There could certainly be additional remedies. My guess is that the respondents would choose one of these alternatives to stating flat out that they had an obligation to drive the person to the interview. Clearly, the saboteur has an obligation to do something, and it would clearly be in the interest of the victim that that something involve a real possibility.
1
The two concepts of 'ought' and 'can't' exist in two mostly separate categories though it is hard to separate them sometimes. Ought is mostly a mental concept to most people. Can't is mostly a physical one involving an action not capable of being completed.
In our daily lives to which these concepts were applied in these studies the physical and mental roots of these concepts become confused. Some of this is plane old confusion of language and some what we perceive as mental and physical which overlap in so many cases.
In any case the argument to most people would seem to fall into the category of how many angels can fit onto the head of a pin except to philosophers and NYT editors.
In our daily lives to which these concepts were applied in these studies the physical and mental roots of these concepts become confused. Some of this is plane old confusion of language and some what we perceive as mental and physical which overlap in so many cases.
In any case the argument to most people would seem to fall into the category of how many angels can fit onto the head of a pin except to philosophers and NYT editors.
Kant poses the notion of ought within the framing of free will. The willingness to drive the friend/competitor to the airport, for example, is a moral decision, of which the "can" is operative at the time the decision is made. The flat tire has no effect on the desire, expressed as moral will, within the situation. Less controversially, though, one also must factor in the context of the situation - in this case, a competition. If the friend is a competitor, then aiding the competitor, albeit a friend, could be considered a violation of the very concept of competition - against the rules of the game. Would it be moral for a basketball payer to hand his opponent the ball? The "game" implies, at the very least, a "hands off" attitude amongst competitors, and then a warm handshake after the tourney.
1
I suppose it depends on what you think normative theory is for. If it's intended as a guide for individual deliberation then studies like this should rightly make us suspicious. If it's a rational reflection on practical reasoning then it's an open question whether the principle or the practice is defective. We can presumably learn to change some of our judgments in the same way that cognitive behavioral therapy intervenes in patterns of thinking, even while accepting that the choices we make are grounded in evolved mental machinery that can't quite accommodate offline reflective, retrospective thinking about what is good.
Experimental philosophy and "the new science of morality" could potentially help us get closer to rational intuitionistic moral theory through self knowledge like identification of defects or contribute to reconsideration of practical forms of ethical training that have a better psychological "fit" to what kinds of demands we can accept or cultivate, what can be brought online in everyday thinking which might be quite distant from ultimate justifications.
Experimental philosophy and "the new science of morality" could potentially help us get closer to rational intuitionistic moral theory through self knowledge like identification of defects or contribute to reconsideration of practical forms of ethical training that have a better psychological "fit" to what kinds of demands we can accept or cultivate, what can be brought online in everyday thinking which might be quite distant from ultimate justifications.
Perhaps Kant couldn't envision the deliberate puncturing of a gas tank, blind to such machinations. Although I'm otherwise a fan of thought experiments, I wonder where the boundary lies between the plausible and the fanciful.
I agree that the philosophers (if not their department) should attend to the psychologists; the greater challenge, and benefit, may derive from the psychologists turning to philosophy, or at least to the history of their discipline.
I agree that the philosophers (if not their department) should attend to the psychologists; the greater challenge, and benefit, may derive from the psychologists turning to philosophy, or at least to the history of their discipline.
1
There is nothing special about the example of puncturing a gas tank. This is simply a scenario where someone deliberately undermines his ability to carry out some task, yet (apparently) is still held morally accountable. Injuring myself so I cannot serve in the military would be another example, as would intentionally bankrupting a country so that it cannot pay for its social programs. There are an endless number of such examples and Kant would have no difficulty in envisioning them.
Now as I suggested in my other comment, it's pretty clear that the researchers' "experiment" misses the point and does not challenge the Kantian principle that "ought" implies "can." This speaks to your other point of the challenge of social scientists turning to philosophy. I know that everyone-or at least everyone who is intelligent-- thinks they can do philosophy. But it's a lot trickier than it looks.
Now as I suggested in my other comment, it's pretty clear that the researchers' "experiment" misses the point and does not challenge the Kantian principle that "ought" implies "can." This speaks to your other point of the challenge of social scientists turning to philosophy. I know that everyone-or at least everyone who is intelligent-- thinks they can do philosophy. But it's a lot trickier than it looks.
For an entirely different take on the philosophy of morality, it is interesting that some Buddhist traditions require their adherents to vow to end all suffering of all beings, everywhere.
Clearly, they "can't". Yet they believe they "ought" to, and the outcome if they are sincere in making that vow is directed, moral behavior.
Irrespective of its illogic and absurdity, this seems a more compassionate approach to a moral philosophy than any logical argument could ever aspire to.
Clearly, they "can't". Yet they believe they "ought" to, and the outcome if they are sincere in making that vow is directed, moral behavior.
Irrespective of its illogic and absurdity, this seems a more compassionate approach to a moral philosophy than any logical argument could ever aspire to.
3
Oh lord, ought not moral philosophers have better things to do than this? I think I hear fiddles.
Yes, friend ought to drive friend, but once car breaks down and these two scenarios arise, the content implied in the meaning of "ought" changes. In the first scenario, the car is simply no longer operational, so there ought not be any responsibility to drive a broke-down car, to insist otherwise is clearly irrational. Maybe this part of the thought experiment is best answered by a person more practical and apropos than a philosopher? Like a mechanic.
In the second case, where the friend has disabled the car for her own advantage, then in establishing blame, the friend ought to have to drive, but can't, so instead ought to suffer the consequences of the moral responsibility implied in the obligation of committing to driving said friend and so suffer the consequences of that responsibility with respect to her future job prospect. Which she can.
Yes, friend ought to drive friend, but once car breaks down and these two scenarios arise, the content implied in the meaning of "ought" changes. In the first scenario, the car is simply no longer operational, so there ought not be any responsibility to drive a broke-down car, to insist otherwise is clearly irrational. Maybe this part of the thought experiment is best answered by a person more practical and apropos than a philosopher? Like a mechanic.
In the second case, where the friend has disabled the car for her own advantage, then in establishing blame, the friend ought to have to drive, but can't, so instead ought to suffer the consequences of the moral responsibility implied in the obligation of committing to driving said friend and so suffer the consequences of that responsibility with respect to her future job prospect. Which she can.
I think our climate situation present a good example of this:
We ought to limit cumulative carbon emissions to no more than 500 Gt since the preindustrial era. We ought to limit global average temperature rise to no more than 1-1.5C.
But to achieve even the agreed 2C goal we will require the use of carbon removal technologies that presently do not exist.
So perhaps the obligation of those in the ought-but-can't situation becomes one to get busy developing a way anyhow.
We ought to limit cumulative carbon emissions to no more than 500 Gt since the preindustrial era. We ought to limit global average temperature rise to no more than 1-1.5C.
But to achieve even the agreed 2C goal we will require the use of carbon removal technologies that presently do not exist.
So perhaps the obligation of those in the ought-but-can't situation becomes one to get busy developing a way anyhow.
1
Buddhism explains this well. There is no difference between getting the job and not. Winning and losing are the same. It is sorry that this story attempts to explain morality by a competitive, individualistic example. Morality is the compete antithesis of this. It is based on compassion and sympathy. Morality based upon compassion - identifying with others - is real. All else is a form of narcissism - western culture - and is ephemeral.
4
Even if an accident prevents a person from doing the "ought," that person still can, in other words, regardless of extenuating circumstances, even if the person fails to do the "ought," the "can" is still valid. The empirical argument seems to be that failure to do the "ought" nullifies It as a "can." Not so. Kant's position is of the mind The studies are interesting but simply exercises in trying to justify the rejection of a position that is actually untouchable by empirical evidence. Interviews and anecdotes fail, in my judgment, to nullify Kant's position.
4
What does the author's data tell us? Today "ought" is used to indicate obligation/duty or advisability. There's an obvious link to blame. "Can" is used to indicate having a possibility, ability, right or power and is frequently interchangeable with "may" - it's much more neutral. So the author's results with English speakers accords with normal English usage today. That's entirely predictable and trivial.
Does this result amount to a substantive critique of Kant's thinking? "Ought equals can" is a summary statement in English of Kant's subltle and complex argument (in German). It doesn't make sense to someone who hasn't studied Philosophy, which suggests that taking pot shots at it out of context is superficial, not a good advertisement for "experimental philosophy". Philosophers should take science courses to see examples of good experimental design. Whether comparable experiments are possible in philosophy is another question.
Does this result amount to a substantive critique of Kant's thinking? "Ought equals can" is a summary statement in English of Kant's subltle and complex argument (in German). It doesn't make sense to someone who hasn't studied Philosophy, which suggests that taking pot shots at it out of context is superficial, not a good advertisement for "experimental philosophy". Philosophers should take science courses to see examples of good experimental design. Whether comparable experiments are possible in philosophy is another question.
3
There is a large fallacy in this argument -- it supposes that one should be able to confer his or her problems upon others, which is very Nietzschean. The gist of Kant is personal responsibility as well as the definition of individuality. Thus, one ought not confer their problems on others. It is unethical and counterintuitive to place passive aggressive assumptions and responsibilities upon any individual. It is also petty to ask anyone to keep promises in lieu of upstanding, unspoken loyalty.
1
It is sad to see philosophy develop into a sort of empirical psychology--Kant would have thought it absurd that someone would poll a bunch of people to find out whether or not his theory was correct, as if ethics is just a matter of collecting intuitions. I get it, I was in the field for about 8 years, the "sexy" new thing is empirical approaches--the social "sciences" got jealous of the natural sciences and so tried to become more rigorous, and now the humanities want to get "serious" as well, and so we get this sort of thing, a new-found scientific approach to philosophy.
In a way, the field is becoming anti-Socratic--rather than using rational argument and inquiry to refine, criticize, and change simple intuitions, philosophers now go out and collect a bunch of intuitions and call it a refutation of a philosophical theory.
In a way, the field is becoming anti-Socratic--rather than using rational argument and inquiry to refine, criticize, and change simple intuitions, philosophers now go out and collect a bunch of intuitions and call it a refutation of a philosophical theory.
5
What is even more silly about the so-called scientific approach to philosophy, psychology and the humanities is that it lacks the very foundations of the scientific method: random assignment and proper controls. Merely calling something empirical or scientific does not make it so.
The problem with the authors' thesis is they force the participants in the experiment to use only the term "ought" to express moral outrage at the act (intentionally damaging a car to prevent a friend attending an interview), when there are multiple logical alternatives given the impossibility of corrective action (getting to the interview on time). Such alternatives range from the mild, "You owe me one," to the extreme "I will punish you for this." "Ought," by definition does in fact does imply "can", else the term is without meaning. Telling someone they ought to do an impossible task is illogical. Constraining a hypothetical, such that "ought" or "ought not" are the only responses to such a moral failure forces an answer that, while superficially un-Kantian, does nothing to undermine the categorical imperative given the false choices asked of the participants.
1
Kant argued for categorical imperatives in moral behavior, and did so with a linguistic approach that, while rigorous, would leave the vast majority of the non-philosophers in this study totally confused. So it seems tendentious to use a psychology experiment done in ordinary prose with uninitiated subjects to "test" for the validity of a concept like moral obligation in the Kantian sense of the transcendental existence of an ideal categorical imperative; a term like "ought", which seems on the surface like a concept everybody understands in more or less the same way, means something very specific in the context of Kant's Second Critique, so this attempt to analyze it as if plain language were sufficient to render Kant's position in its full nuance to test subjects strikes me as perhaps a clever ploy for getting attention, but also one of two bad things: it's either unserious intellectually or it's disingenuous. In any case, tut tut.
4
"...linguistic approach that, while rigorous, would leave the vast majority of the non-philosophers in this study totally confused."
"When a philosopher answers me, I no longer understand my question." Pierre Desproges.
Tut-tut, indeed.
"When a philosopher answers me, I no longer understand my question." Pierre Desproges.
Tut-tut, indeed.
While I am please to see these academicians trying to build connections between philosophy and psychology, I do think they've erred in their procedure in this case. In terms of ethics, “ought” judgments are not connected to concerns about ability only; they are connected to concerns about both responsibility (obligation) and ability. When a party who is able fails to carry out his ethical responsibility (obligation), then two psychological responses normally occur: guilt within the failed actor and blame from the damaged party. Where either ability or obligation is absent, then blame is inappropriate.
In the thought experiment where one party sabotages her own ability to fulfill her obligation, to say she is "unable" to do so is incorrect. She simply chose to not do so and is ethically culpable; she should feel guilty, and the aggrieved part is correct to blame her. To suggest otherwise is to confuse responsibility with ability and the researchers ought to know better.
In the thought experiment where one party sabotages her own ability to fulfill her obligation, to say she is "unable" to do so is incorrect. She simply chose to not do so and is ethically culpable; she should feel guilty, and the aggrieved part is correct to blame her. To suggest otherwise is to confuse responsibility with ability and the researchers ought to know better.
5
Or, as others have observed, the researchers got their paradigm backwards. "Ought" does not imply "can". Rather, "can" implies "ought", esp. when a moral obligation (such as a promise) also exists. The researchers can blame Kant for their mistake, but they ought not to.
1
The Kant idea here appears to me self-evident--that Kant was pointing out our moral obligations should not be expected to deviate from what we can actually do, much like we should not expect a runner to run much faster than the runner has demonstrated himself capable of doing. Obligations should closely match actual capacity.
That many people do not follow Kant's prescription does not say anything about Kant being wrong--in fact, that he gave the thought implies he thought many do not hold it--but rather that people in many instances, when for example, they blame someone or dislike someone or simply take advantage of someone, expect people to do more than they actually can do, and in other instances, probably because they are not blaming a person or because they simply like a person, give a person a break, expect less than the person can actually do...
It seems obvious that in many instances we humans do not know exactly what we or others can do in a variety of cases--we have not, and in many instances do not want to, calculate inherent capacity for thought or action or behavior. The Kant prescription seems more a pointer in the direction that we should be reasonable about what we can or cannot do rather than an observation that that is how people actually behave toward one another. In fact it is obvious people do not behave that way toward one another--we constantly drive some people too hard and drive others too little; history of power is replete with examples.
That many people do not follow Kant's prescription does not say anything about Kant being wrong--in fact, that he gave the thought implies he thought many do not hold it--but rather that people in many instances, when for example, they blame someone or dislike someone or simply take advantage of someone, expect people to do more than they actually can do, and in other instances, probably because they are not blaming a person or because they simply like a person, give a person a break, expect less than the person can actually do...
It seems obvious that in many instances we humans do not know exactly what we or others can do in a variety of cases--we have not, and in many instances do not want to, calculate inherent capacity for thought or action or behavior. The Kant prescription seems more a pointer in the direction that we should be reasonable about what we can or cannot do rather than an observation that that is how people actually behave toward one another. In fact it is obvious people do not behave that way toward one another--we constantly drive some people too hard and drive others too little; history of power is replete with examples.
3
At their best, philosophers continue to ask interesting hypothetical questions that the rest of us stop asking after we enter adulthood. Unfortunately, philosophers are a self-selected group who tend to approach things the same way and will therefore often miss what the rest of us take for granted.
My answer to one of the questions posed here is that if I were competing for a job with my friend I would never put her in a position where either accidental or deliberate failure on her part would threaten our friendship and my chances to get the job in question.
btw, I'm guessing that the "participants" in your "experimental philosophy" were college students - another self-selected group with limited adult life experience.
My answer to one of the questions posed here is that if I were competing for a job with my friend I would never put her in a position where either accidental or deliberate failure on her part would threaten our friendship and my chances to get the job in question.
btw, I'm guessing that the "participants" in your "experimental philosophy" were college students - another self-selected group with limited adult life experience.
3
The median age for the experiments was over 30. The experiments were replicated. And there were no detectable effects for age or for gender.
2
This demanding ethic has long been the norm in management circles -- for CEO's and institutional leaders, coaches and managers of professional sports teams, and even political executives. They are held accountable (in effect, personally blamed) for all sorts of events -- e.g., economic downturns, injuries to key players, eruptions of civil violence or disorder, etc. -- that they couldn't possibly have foreseen, much less prevented.
Of course they're also highly (over-?) compensated, so the buck stops with them -- and rightly so.
Of course they're also highly (over-?) compensated, so the buck stops with them -- and rightly so.
3
I'm not going to pay $39.95 to Elsevier to get the details, but I'm concerned that the argument (and certainly this article) has a problem with specificity.
She promised to drive me to the airport. Generalizing only slightly, she promised to take responsibility for getting me to the airport, which could be hailing & paying for a cab, etc. Generalizing ultimately, she has an obligation to me.
So, she has a setback along the way. If it's not intentional, I might relieve her of the obligation, recognizing the effort and circumstance. If it is intentional, she still has an obligation to me. This might still be to get me to the airport - cab, call for help, whatever. If not, she would continue to have an obligation of some sort.
If the research question was posed to participants narrowly - "should she still drive me to the airport" - without alternatives, then the results of the study were a foregone and meaningless conclusion. Unfortunately, I can't tell from this article.
She promised to drive me to the airport. Generalizing only slightly, she promised to take responsibility for getting me to the airport, which could be hailing & paying for a cab, etc. Generalizing ultimately, she has an obligation to me.
So, she has a setback along the way. If it's not intentional, I might relieve her of the obligation, recognizing the effort and circumstance. If it is intentional, she still has an obligation to me. This might still be to get me to the airport - cab, call for help, whatever. If not, she would continue to have an obligation of some sort.
If the research question was posed to participants narrowly - "should she still drive me to the airport" - without alternatives, then the results of the study were a foregone and meaningless conclusion. Unfortunately, I can't tell from this article.
48
I am disturbed by the reasoning here on two levels. First, it is obvious that the non-philosophers polled understood "has an obligation" in a very different sense from Kant. They probably equated it with "has incurred a debt that needs repaying," or something very much like that. It's not strange that they did this, since we commonly use "debt" and "obligation" as synonymous in, say, financial contexts. Kant would not think to deny that, if X sabotages Y, X needs to compensate Y however she can, perhaps by calling the people offering the job, explaining the situation and even withdrawing herself from the competition if necessary; or in some other way.
What Kant is saying is that, if a court could be instantaneously convened to judge what X must do, it could not possibly require her to drive Y to the airport, and no sane person would disagree. It would instead require her to make amends in some possible and commensurate way, thereby discharging her obligation to Y.
What really bothers me here is that philosophers are now treating difficult problems in their discipline as matters to be decided by surveys of randomly chosen lay people, without bothering to find out anything about the thought processes that underlie their decisions. Now, I am admittedly guessing what I think most people who say that Y has an obligation to do the impossible really mean, but the authors of this piece haven't even bothered to consider that this needs to be taken into consideration.
What Kant is saying is that, if a court could be instantaneously convened to judge what X must do, it could not possibly require her to drive Y to the airport, and no sane person would disagree. It would instead require her to make amends in some possible and commensurate way, thereby discharging her obligation to Y.
What really bothers me here is that philosophers are now treating difficult problems in their discipline as matters to be decided by surveys of randomly chosen lay people, without bothering to find out anything about the thought processes that underlie their decisions. Now, I am admittedly guessing what I think most people who say that Y has an obligation to do the impossible really mean, but the authors of this piece haven't even bothered to consider that this needs to be taken into consideration.
75
Please note that the authors' field is sociology, not philosophy.
Please also note that, while many in the field of philosophy have been drawn to something they call "experimental philosophy", the bulk of the profession views that approach to be deeply flawed, and for reasons much like what this commenter brings up. Please do not confuse the mistakes of a few with being the trends of the field!
Please also note that, while many in the field of philosophy have been drawn to something they call "experimental philosophy", the bulk of the profession views that approach to be deeply flawed, and for reasons much like what this commenter brings up. Please do not confuse the mistakes of a few with being the trends of the field!
You have not offered a counter-example to Kant's principle, but are simply playing games with the word "can." The woman who punctures her own gas tank certainly has the capacity to drive her friend to the airport, but freely chooses to render herself unable to fulfill her obligation. When Kant says "ought implies can" he is excluding cases that are genuinely beyond our control; that is not at all what is described in this silly example.
Suppose someone is crying for help as he drowns in a river and I pick up a gun and intentionally shoot myself in the foot and am rendered helpless. Have I thereby excused myself of all responsibility for his subsequent death? Indeed, your proposed counter-example is reminiscent of the humorous definition of the word "chutzpah": namely, someone who kills both his parents and then asks the court for mercy because he is an orphan. On your account, it seems, rather than viewing this as a joke we should take it as a serious proposal on the part of the murderer.
This leads to a deeper problem with the subsequent analysis that is offered here. The suggestion is made that the key factor is blame, not ability, as Kant suggested. This misses the fact that Kant's focus on ability is precisely a way of clarifying the notion of blame--specifying when it is appropriate. We blame the woman puncturing the gas tank because we recognize that she in reality she can (in the relevant sense of that word) drive her friend to the airport, but decides not to.
Suppose someone is crying for help as he drowns in a river and I pick up a gun and intentionally shoot myself in the foot and am rendered helpless. Have I thereby excused myself of all responsibility for his subsequent death? Indeed, your proposed counter-example is reminiscent of the humorous definition of the word "chutzpah": namely, someone who kills both his parents and then asks the court for mercy because he is an orphan. On your account, it seems, rather than viewing this as a joke we should take it as a serious proposal on the part of the murderer.
This leads to a deeper problem with the subsequent analysis that is offered here. The suggestion is made that the key factor is blame, not ability, as Kant suggested. This misses the fact that Kant's focus on ability is precisely a way of clarifying the notion of blame--specifying when it is appropriate. We blame the woman puncturing the gas tank because we recognize that she in reality she can (in the relevant sense of that word) drive her friend to the airport, but decides not to.
79
Not to belabor the point, but I would like to add one further clarification. The authors might respond to my above examples (of the drowning man and the orphan) by agreeing with my moral evaluation, but insisting that the key issue is "blame" rather than "capacity." What I am suggesting is that once we recognize that their argument simply turns on obscuring Kant's use of the word "can," we see that the assignment of blame and the acknowledgment of agent capacity go hand-in-hand. From Kant's perspective, when we say that I "can" help the drowning man, this is implicitly assuming an "all things being equal clause"--namely that I don't have a heart attack, or intentionally sabotage myself, etc. Similarly, of course, with the woman and the job interview. Once this assumption, which normally would be taken for granted, is made explicit, it becomes evident that we assign moral blame in exactly those cases where we say that someone "could" have done otherwise. Kant's principle holds.
And this brings out the basic problem I often have with so-called experimental philosophy. Everything that is of importance philosophically takes place in the initial framing of the experiment; compiling the intuitions of non-philosophers does not add anything to our understanding of the issue.
And this brings out the basic problem I often have with so-called experimental philosophy. Everything that is of importance philosophically takes place in the initial framing of the experiment; compiling the intuitions of non-philosophers does not add anything to our understanding of the issue.
2
"When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty, said in a rather scornful tone. "it means just what I choose it to mean-neither more nor less."
"The question is," said Alice, "whether you can make words mean so many different things."
"The question is," said Humpty Dumpty. "which is to be master- that's all."
Lewis Carroll from "Through the Looking- Glass" aka "Alice in Wonderland"
"The question is," said Alice, "whether you can make words mean so many different things."
"The question is," said Humpty Dumpty. "which is to be master- that's all."
Lewis Carroll from "Through the Looking- Glass" aka "Alice in Wonderland"
2
Yikes! This is why philosophy is dead.
I hate to put a damper of potentially hundreds of years of research, but here is the answer: Whether her car broke by accident or broke by design, once it breaks, she can't drive you to the airport.
I hate to put a damper of potentially hundreds of years of research, but here is the answer: Whether her car broke by accident or broke by design, once it breaks, she can't drive you to the airport.
23
She should rent a car. The moral imperative is that one should do everything within one's power. Ought implies should not can. Sorry Kant.
1
Exactly, "Outside the Box." This is the kind of discussion philosopher's hold to justify themselves as philosophers while making absolutely no contribution to the well being of humanity.
Please note that the authors's area of study is sociology, not philosophy. Genuine moral philosophers will point out that this article commits a rich range of conceptual errors. Any time a person explores an area outside of their own expertise, they are likely to make sophomoric errors. Don't blame professional philosophers for the mistaken views of interlopers.
The moral duty of an individual is a necessity to act according to what's dictated by the categorical imperative (a reflection of moral universalism) which becomes a supreme moral principle in itself. Thus "ought" means "can" in Kent's moral philosophy.
5
Kent's be read as Kant's.
This bit makes me cringe:
"But with stories in which the inability to help was accidental, the obligation all but disappeared. Now, only 31 percent of our participants said your friend still ought to drive you."
How do you define "all but disappeared"?
"But with stories in which the inability to help was accidental, the obligation all but disappeared. Now, only 31 percent of our participants said your friend still ought to drive you."
How do you define "all but disappeared"?
16
No, no. Of course "ought" equals "can". The issue of blame is irrelevant -- in this example she ought not to have purposely punctured the gas tank but she did, rendering completion of the obligation impossible. Subsequently, what she ought to do is clearly constrained by the lack of ability to complete the task.
"Ought" and "blame" had already had their dance when she contemplated whether to puncture the tank. It was a different moral situation than when they sit by the side of the Van Wyck, with no way to get to JFK.
"Ought" and "blame" had already had their dance when she contemplated whether to puncture the tank. It was a different moral situation than when they sit by the side of the Van Wyck, with no way to get to JFK.
19
Philosophy should not be an exercise in the blind leading the blind. In the case of a woman driving her friend to the airport, there may be other factors: perhaps she has "more mouths to feed," which might justify her piercing the gas tank (to benefit the "greater good"). One should also ask the question, "If one can assign blame, is there a moral obligation to do so?" I would suggest there would only be such an obligation to the extent that it prevented one from committing a similar act in the future.
Leo Toribio
Pittsburgh, PA
Leo Toribio
Pittsburgh, PA
2
"You brain monkees kill me" - Dr. Sheldon Cooper (fictional)
The offer to drive the friend to the airport with a self punctured gas tank is a fraudulent contract. Contracts based on fraud can not be enforced. There is no obligation.
I'm going with Sheldon on this one.
The offer to drive the friend to the airport with a self punctured gas tank is a fraudulent contract. Contracts based on fraud can not be enforced. There is no obligation.
I'm going with Sheldon on this one.
7
The moral obligation is to avoid making promises one does not intend to keep. Fraud doesn't eliminate the obligation.
The essence of it is that we cant be held responsible for what is not in our control. The thought experiment is a mess for many reasons the most basic is that the friend has an obligation not to deceive you. That's the primary breach of duty. Its superficial to discuss the car. It would be ok if she got you a taxi instead of your own self-sabotaged car. All of the discussion about not being able to use a car to fulfill a promise once the car is broken is irrelevant. Similarly, we have a duty not to murder but once you have intentionally severed both carotid arteries with a knife you can't undo that. The duty referred to refraining from any and all acts which would lead to intentional murder.
20
Kant wasn't interested in whether undergraduates could be tricked into denying that ought implies can. He was interested in whether ought implies can.
38
I think Peter is correct. The issue for Kant is not: "What we shall say when." On the other hand, I do think that "blame" or "responsibility" underlies the issue of "ought implies can." But this then leads to the question, are those who blame people for failing to do what they cannot do justified in doing so? In the scenario envisioned, the the person who renders it impossible to drive to the airport is to blame for that and, so, she is to blame for not getting to the airport. We might say, after the fact, that she "ought to have driven to the airport" (rather than making it impossible to do so); but, what sense is there to say at the time when it is impossible to get there that she ought to do so?
There once was a man who thought he could,
but he couldn't ,
so they called him Kant
but he couldn't ,
so they called him Kant
Seems to me ought implies can in your dreams mostly. Ralph Kramden says "I oughta...." but he never does - can he really?
2
A little off putting that these geekish problems still cause a stir. Like the Gettier problems in epistemology and their severed head and barn facsimile attempted solutions: no wonder their closing up shop in universities.
This "problem" simply shows badly defined our terms are. I can resolve it by simply stating that ought does in fact entail can. The case at hand with the woman puncturing her gas tank. Let's just call this a residual ought and be done with it.
Sorry if I've put the kibosh on someone's dissertation. Do Levinas and Husserl. Infinitely more interesting.
This "problem" simply shows badly defined our terms are. I can resolve it by simply stating that ought does in fact entail can. The case at hand with the woman puncturing her gas tank. Let's just call this a residual ought and be done with it.
Sorry if I've put the kibosh on someone's dissertation. Do Levinas and Husserl. Infinitely more interesting.
5
Like most experiments which allegedly prove or disprove philosophical claims, there are always multiple interpretations of the results that create new problems, rather than solve old ones.
As I see it, the reason we still see an obligation for the person who punctured the gas tank was that they chose to puncture the gas tank. Thus even though they can't drive you to the airport now, they COULD have driven you to the airport at an earlier point in time. The fact that this person chose to destroy the possible world in which they could have driven you to the airport, and could have chosen otherwise, is what produces the obligation and the blame. Thus the "ought" emerges from the "can" in this case, just as in any other. "Could" is just the past tense of "can", and the temporal change is morally irrelevant here.
As I see it, the reason we still see an obligation for the person who punctured the gas tank was that they chose to puncture the gas tank. Thus even though they can't drive you to the airport now, they COULD have driven you to the airport at an earlier point in time. The fact that this person chose to destroy the possible world in which they could have driven you to the airport, and could have chosen otherwise, is what produces the obligation and the blame. Thus the "ought" emerges from the "can" in this case, just as in any other. "Could" is just the past tense of "can", and the temporal change is morally irrelevant here.
6
Kant the greatest philosopher? The greatest bore, yes. The most exhaustive in his quest to clarify the obvious, maybe. For me, he represents everything ridiculous about Academe: bloated intellectuals who never use two words when two thousand will suffice.
I'd say the greatest philosopher would be Wittgenstein -- who basically explained why any rigorous analytical approach to metaphysical philosophy, such as Kant's, is 'wrongheaded' from the start. After the Enlightenment, and the relative success of scientific principles of analytical study, philosophers imagined that they could apply these same principles to any field of study, and come up with similar proofs and models for metaphysics as the scientists had done for physics. Frege, Bertrand Russell, AJ Ayer and, ultimately, Wittgenstein, tried to break down language into mathematical structures so that philosophy could be dealt with in a scientific way, but they found that language and human understanding had too nebulous a connection. In other words, we could understand concepts without any need for 100% precision -- the kind Kant was aiming for -- instead, we use 'fuzzy logic'. Ironically, now this concept of 'fuzzy logic' is being applied by scientists.
I'd say the greatest philosopher would be Wittgenstein -- who basically explained why any rigorous analytical approach to metaphysical philosophy, such as Kant's, is 'wrongheaded' from the start. After the Enlightenment, and the relative success of scientific principles of analytical study, philosophers imagined that they could apply these same principles to any field of study, and come up with similar proofs and models for metaphysics as the scientists had done for physics. Frege, Bertrand Russell, AJ Ayer and, ultimately, Wittgenstein, tried to break down language into mathematical structures so that philosophy could be dealt with in a scientific way, but they found that language and human understanding had too nebulous a connection. In other words, we could understand concepts without any need for 100% precision -- the kind Kant was aiming for -- instead, we use 'fuzzy logic'. Ironically, now this concept of 'fuzzy logic' is being applied by scientists.
7
He wasn't the greatest bore, though he may have been the greatest annoyer. Just review his acrobatics in defending the concept of free will.
It seems to me that while a degree in philosophy might give that individual a certain understanding not available to the average person, it does not make that person an authority as such. Aristotle (although he too was an elitist) suggested that anyone could become practically wise and virtuous through experience. So, perhaps we should pay more attention to "participants" in such experiments than those who pontificate from the halls of learning.
4
We ought to do what we ought to do and we ought not try to find a way to not do what we ought to do.
4
The principle in question is that if some action is right, then it is a possible action. The situation where the action is intentionally sabotaged is just that. The counterexample equivocates on time. The "ought" is applied to a time before the sabotage, and the "can" is applied to a time after the sabotage.
2
Are the participants (and authors) possibly confusing "oughtn't to have punctured the gas tank" with "ought to drive him to the airport"?
In the law, it frequently arises that a defendant is liable but unable to pay damages, in which case the plaintiff is pretty much out of luck. In such cases it does seem unjust that the plaintiff will not be made whole, not because we can't see, or convince a jury to see, that the defendant is blameworthy, but simply because we provide no alternative source of compensation. But think what would happen if we did. We would basically be punishing all those defendants, many of them businesses, who had maintained liability insurance all the while, and didn't just wait until they caused someone else an injury.
In other words, the possibility of situations where one ought to do something but can't has already been much discussed among legal theorists, and is a major reason for having laws that require entities to maintain insurance of various kinds.
In the law, it frequently arises that a defendant is liable but unable to pay damages, in which case the plaintiff is pretty much out of luck. In such cases it does seem unjust that the plaintiff will not be made whole, not because we can't see, or convince a jury to see, that the defendant is blameworthy, but simply because we provide no alternative source of compensation. But think what would happen if we did. We would basically be punishing all those defendants, many of them businesses, who had maintained liability insurance all the while, and didn't just wait until they caused someone else an injury.
In other words, the possibility of situations where one ought to do something but can't has already been much discussed among legal theorists, and is a major reason for having laws that require entities to maintain insurance of various kinds.
3
Kant is right. Both people ought to drive as promised, until they no longer can. In the case of sabotage, it's not that she ought to drive at that point - that makes no sense since it's impossible. But she ought not to have intentionally sabotaged her vehicle (something she was able to refrain from doing.) The blame shouldn't make her obligated to drive (that makes no sense), but obligated to somehow make it up to the person she intentionally let down, once it's too late to do anything about it.
4
Here I think the philosophers' intuitions are correct. It's easy to allow one's sense of blame to bleed over into one's feeling of ought. In this case the driver's blame lingers, but the obligation has lapsed. No one would say: "The driver has an obligation to drive the passenger to the airport in this broken down car."
By the way, I just gave my wife the drive to the airport scenario
and when asked if her friend who sabotaged the car should still
drive her to the airport, she said, "I think I shouldn't ask her in
the first place." My point exactly. She's Japanese, by the way.
and when asked if her friend who sabotaged the car should still
drive her to the airport, she said, "I think I shouldn't ask her in
the first place." My point exactly. She's Japanese, by the way.
4
The flaw in this experiment is that it doesn't allow people to flesh out what they likely mean. If you asked the participants whether the friend with the punctured gas tank ought to drive you to the airport with her non-functioning car (impossible, i.e. can't) OR if she ought to get you to the airport some other way (possible, i.e. can), I bet most people who selected the former in this study would instead select the latter. Because the friend promised you the ride and prevented you from getting it by puncturing the tank, she ought to ensure she fulfills her obligation of getting you to the airport. She also ought not have punctured the tank in the first place. When study participants answer that she still ought to drive you to the airport, the above positions are what they are trying to, but cannot, express.
5
"At the very least, philosophers can no longer treat this principle as obviously true."
Could any philosopher worth his/her/their beans possibly think any principle is "obviously true"?
Beyond which, one might want to ask, what ethics that is impossible is really an ethics at all--unless it is purely on conceptual/hypothetical and thus divorced from practical application.
Could any philosopher worth his/her/their beans possibly think any principle is "obviously true"?
Beyond which, one might want to ask, what ethics that is impossible is really an ethics at all--unless it is purely on conceptual/hypothetical and thus divorced from practical application.
4
One problem is that we rely to much on the limited abilities of verbal thinking, which Wittgenstein realized, although he appeared not to realize that mathematical thinking also has limitations, if different ones. They both bind us to particular "paths" and rules in thinking. What's left then? Well, for one, visual thinking. Visual thinking is not bound by the genetic predispositions of language or math. Einstein employed visual thinking in developing the great concept that profoundly changed physics, etc.
Ought is subjective.
Your ought is not necessarily my ought. Kant was a purveyor of guilt. His philosophy was what he categorized as your duty to your fellow men, that you owed it to them, and it was a moral fault if you did not serve them as he tried to make you believe you should.
His ultimate aim was altruism, you "ought" to put everyone else's welfare ahead of your own. Your wishes, hopes, desires, are not as important as are others. This also was the moral imperative of the Fascists regimes. Your life is subordinate to the rest of the herd.
Your ought is not necessarily my ought. Kant was a purveyor of guilt. His philosophy was what he categorized as your duty to your fellow men, that you owed it to them, and it was a moral fault if you did not serve them as he tried to make you believe you should.
His ultimate aim was altruism, you "ought" to put everyone else's welfare ahead of your own. Your wishes, hopes, desires, are not as important as are others. This also was the moral imperative of the Fascists regimes. Your life is subordinate to the rest of the herd.
8
The problem with Kant’s “ought” is that Kant takes the word to mean “can” when “must” was what he was thinking. OK, so I promised my friend to drive him to the airport but on my way, I changed my mind, deciding, “why can't t he take a cab?” (I’m not his chauffeur.) I still “could have” driven him but should have I? That I got the job shouldn’t be important because I still could have gotten it (or not) for other reasons - other than, that is, my “failing” to keep my promise. (As the joke goes, “altruism” means nothing more than mowing your neighbor’s lawn.)
What about if my moral system simply does not contain the "ought"?
3
If you have a moral system, you have oughts. A moral system has to constrain or limit behaviour in some way or it wouldn't work.
1
I'd wonder what kind of moral system that was. I'd also suggest that if this is not a problem for you, don't worry about it nor ask us to worry about you.
I think that the authors miss the obvious - Kant assumed a rational being - the authors postulate an irrational being - Duh....
53
In terms of reaching a specifically defined goal, rationality may play a role. But these are situations where the goal --like reaching the airport in time-- has already been reached, and missed. I think the factor of (ir)rationality cannot be added to this equation where something like a goal or a definable end result is nonexistent and we cannot conjecture with certainty how a rational being would react in these situations of aftermath.
Perhaps inchoate, but the authors suggest that for the human, blame matters, and this "implies" some biologically intrinsic human moral code.
Whether Kantian intelligent designers (all human as best I know) approve this human moral code, who cares? Empirically the experiments seem to suggest a moral code is intrinsic to humans. So the kantian argument is that the humans should have a non human, logically (by what warrant?), moral code, just as humans should have a non human metaphysics, and if they were really smart they would. But, they don't. So, here we are.
Whether Kantian intelligent designers (all human as best I know) approve this human moral code, who cares? Empirically the experiments seem to suggest a moral code is intrinsic to humans. So the kantian argument is that the humans should have a non human, logically (by what warrant?), moral code, just as humans should have a non human metaphysics, and if they were really smart they would. But, they don't. So, here we are.
2
Recent studies indicate that the brain provides us with a quick answer based on the easy solution and then rationalizes that answer and bolsters it with emotion. Only with effort does the rational brain get into the act. See Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow.
I for one have always had this problem with the need to assign blame, and "...it seems we’re saying it not because she’s unable to do it, but because we don’t want to unfairly blame her for not keeping it." is absurd, because if someone is unable to do something because of circumstances beyond one's control it is not only unfair to blame them, it's absurd.
This is right up there with the concept that someone who says something that's wrong is "lying," when they are simple wrong about what they know. Repeating something you know to be wrong and asserting it as the truth is lying.
This is right up there with the concept that someone who says something that's wrong is "lying," when they are simple wrong about what they know. Repeating something you know to be wrong and asserting it as the truth is lying.
29
I do not agree you come to a correct conclusion on a moral philosophy issue by running thought experiments and taking a vote. You can find out what an average view is, but not necessarily a correct one. In many cases of moral questions only a small minority is correct.
At any rate this is not about blame, it's about nagging. Is a demand is worth anything, such that one may illogically set aside, "can" because "ought" includes a desirable demand? Impossible demands are about the person doing the demanding, not the activity about which the demand is being made.
At any rate this is not about blame, it's about nagging. Is a demand is worth anything, such that one may illogically set aside, "can" because "ought" includes a desirable demand? Impossible demands are about the person doing the demanding, not the activity about which the demand is being made.
30
Wow. Does the author live under a rock? Most versions of Christianity teach that the 10 Commandments _ought_ to be obeyed and yet _can not_. The purpose of the Law is to show us our need for a path to Heaven which does not rely on being good. The author's assertion that "ought implies can is universal" is far out of line with reality. At least a billion people profess the opposite.
5
At least 3 billion people profess that gods exist, that is out of line with reality.
1
The ten commandments are pretty easy to keep. Most people who aren't in jail have managed to keep most of them, most of the time. But I think you can make a similar point about the Sermon on the Mount.
1. if I promise to do something, I should (ought) to do it. If for some reason it turns out to be impossible then my obligation disappears. If I deliberately created the condition that made it impossible to keep my promise, then I have violated my promise.
2. Kant also believed lying is always wrong. In that I think he was mistaken.
3. I'm not sure relying on a vote of people's intuitions is a reliable way to create an ethical system. It sure doesn't work for physics.
2. Kant also believed lying is always wrong. In that I think he was mistaken.
3. I'm not sure relying on a vote of people's intuitions is a reliable way to create an ethical system. It sure doesn't work for physics.
138
Could someone explain a couple of things? First, what makes the authors' study different from psychology? That is, how does it qualify as philosophy? I know plenty of moral psychologists who do similar experiments. Second, how many laypeople's opinions are required before a logical argument is shown to be fallacious?
44
You're forgiven for the confusion. Philosophy has re-branded itself. After the development of science, mind-thought experiments were mostly left in the dust. So modern philosophy is now a little of everything.
1
Psychology assumes irrationality as its reason for being; philosophy assumes rationality.
A scenario in which "ought" does not imply "can" is a false scenario. People ought to not lie. If someone agrees to do you a favor (drive you to the airport) but then purposely not do it (puncture their gas tank), then what happens afterward is kind of meaningless. There's little point in discussing what a liar ought to do. Unless the liar is sorry, in which case the liar ought to fess up, and call you a cab. In general terms, when someone does something wrong, they ought to make amends.
15
Right. The only "ought" that meaningfully applies at this point is that she ought to apologize.
I'm sorry but this piece is an exercise in futility. Why the authors didn't take instead of the ought-can, Kant's incredible theory of what are the essential conditions that allow knowledge to be possible?
3
This seems to be an example of simple confusion. The friend who punctures her own gas tank has already committed a crime. She ought not to have punctured the tank, that is entirely where the discussion about what she ought to have done or not done should reside. Once they are stranded on the road, there question of what she ought to do does not arise. If most people are confused by the story, it is because it has been designed to confuse. The fact that one can design a story that confuses people does not say anything about Kant nor the nature of obligation.
200
You should have given a spoiler alert warning. Philosophers enjoy solving these problems themselves.
1
She ought to at least pay for a cab to the airport. Nothing is "impossible". No, you Kant!
An ought question can be any question, if your rules were true (that only reasonable questions exist) then no question would pose a difficulty.
Peirce was saying this a hundred years ago. What does that say about attention?
5
No, if your friend punctures her own gas tank to keep you from getting to the airport, it would be pretty silly to continue to insist that she drive you there. But it's perfectly reasonable (and consistent with Kant) that you insist she find some other way to get you there
15
And if that don't work and she still won't do anything to help you ... you have every right to jump on her back and demand she give you a pony ride to the airport! Airport or Bust!
A thought experiment that requires imagining someone acting against her own self-interest—even in the interest of long-term gain—is flawed at the outset. The hypothetical woman-who-promised has set herself up for a lot of aggravation and expense on the assumption that the two of them are the only applicants for the job. This does not make sense.
and stop referring to her as a friend.
I guess I find this interesting and thought=provoking. But when the car was stuck in the shop my first thought was: why didn't the person call a car service?
7
The question of "Should philosophical principles be based on survey questions" comes to mind. Furthermore, Kant is a fundamentalist. It's pointless to argue with him.
8
There are all kinds of things wrong with this argument, if that's what you can call it, which I wouldn't. However, if the sex of the friend in the hypothetical situation where they intentionally induced sabotage was changed from female to male, I wonder if the results would be the same. Just say'n.
6
I ought to feed the starving...but I cannot feed all of them.
Kant should have made more convincing arguments, but he could not.
Kant should have made more convincing arguments, but he could not.
22
You ought to TRY to feed starving people -- as many as possible. You oughtn't try to feed them all.
You ought to feed some of the starving; you can't feed all of them.
But you can feed some, at least until your money runs out -- and that is the limit of what you ought to do. Nobody can feed all of them, it's crazy to think someone has an obligation to do so.
What you ought do is limited to what's possible. I am under no moral obligation to find aliens in another galaxy and make sure they're healthy. Because I can blame NASA, or physics, doesn't change that.
What you ought do is limited to what's possible. I am under no moral obligation to find aliens in another galaxy and make sure they're healthy. Because I can blame NASA, or physics, doesn't change that.
No matter what caused the car to not operate, the existential issue is if it cannot be, the "ought" is purely fanciful. Blame is mostly narcissistic, and not connected to morality.
4
I might be missing the point here, but being obligated to get someone to the airport is not equivalent to "driving" someone to the airport. So I don't think this experiment proves the point. It is a case of misinterpreting of the question; the participants may not be paying attention to the keyword "driving".
7
Sematics.
4
Except for spelling, you're dead on.
I'm not surprised that years of American public education can have yielded a population unable to understand the earlier meaning of the word 'ought'. (In fact, however, I'm not sure that the way these questions were phrased was the best way.)
7
One of the fuzziest pieces of confusion I've read in the Times recently. Nobody can be obliged to do what they can't do. If it's something they should have done if they could, and they made it impossible, then you can say they're bad, evil, nasty, whatever you like--but you can't say they're obliged to do it. (What are you going to do torture them to fulfill an obligation impossible to fulfill?)
25
In all of his writings, did not Kant refer to any circumstances (such as the deliberate obstructionism committed in the example used here) that would have qualified his principle that "ought" implies "can"?
3
So what does it mean, that one ought to do something that
one can't do? In practical terms, nothing. This is why morality
itself has always been a practical absurdity. Morality based on
blame? This is called sour grapes. Human behavior is a minefield.
Negotiate it at your own risk. Don't blame anyone but yourself
when it blows up in your face.
one can't do? In practical terms, nothing. This is why morality
itself has always been a practical absurdity. Morality based on
blame? This is called sour grapes. Human behavior is a minefield.
Negotiate it at your own risk. Don't blame anyone but yourself
when it blows up in your face.
4
Moral of the Story: Maybe you OUGHT to be more careful in your choice of friends.
You presented your participants with a false choice,and we're surprised when the outcome didn't make much sense. As a philosopher, you should have been mindful of making such an error.
49
She could have driven you to the airport, but chose to puncture her gas tank instead - she ought not to have done that, past tense. She was unethical and it's that simple. Now you are illogically shifting the choice to the present tense after the deed is done. The issue you should be philosophizing about now is which cab company to call.
69
It seems a question that can be answered by quantum mechanics (if at all), where something can exist and not exist simultaneously.
1
Philosophy is about logic, not the meaning that students attribute to a judgment in a psychological experiment.
Logic is sometimes counter-intuitive.
Logic is sometimes counter-intuitive.
7
The problem is most behavioral science experimental designs have a plethora of alternative explanations and alternative interpretations. The behavioral sciences are largely "false rationalities" with the latest fashionable theories leading the way. What seems true in the behavioral sciences today will be gone tomorrow, and it is even arguable whether much if it is valid for everyday decision-making in its own time. There is a lot of chaff out there.
2
A promise to drive someone to the airport made by someone who then purposely disables the car was made in bad faith. That fact renders the "can" vs. "ought" argument moot. They never had any intention of fulfilling the promise. It was a lie.
120
This article is reminiscent of the "ordinary language" school of philosophy that briefly threatened to carry all philosophical problems before it, in the middle of the last century. The new twist is the use of polling to establish the facts about what “we” do or don’t say. But it remains as far from proving anything about the philosophical argument as ever. As some have noted, Kant’s imperative implies capacity (else the moral law is empty). But suppose that the empirical research demonstrated that (for some sample of speakers of some sort of English) we tend to say that a person ought to do something if (but only) if they can be blamed for not doing it. It looks awfully as if the concept of blameworthiness here inherits the problem of emptiness that was supposed to infect the concept of obligation. What is the point of blaming your friend for not doing something if they couldn’t have done it? Like some others, I carried on reading the article because I was mildly intrigued by the idea of counter-examples that would enforce an “ought” judgement in circumstances where capacity was lacking. I am not alone in feeling cheated.
Sounds more like an issue of semantics that an issue of philosophy.
10
Remarkably applicable to all politicians in this election cycle.
2
I may have been thinking along the same lines, but I am not sure.
How about....
Politicians ought to tell the truth on the campaign trail, but can they ?
How about....
Politicians ought to tell the truth on the campaign trail, but can they ?
1
I am allowed to say this because I have a degree in Philosophy. Kant's position, argued through many, many boring pages, is ridiculous. "Ought" equals "can?" The one thing that I took away from my studies is that most renown philosophers spend/spent way too much time with mental noodling. I think philosophy is important and throughout the ages, generally philosophical thought has influenced the times, but succinct and to the point without imaginary things is best.
70
You're stating it incorrectly. The principle in question is not "ought" equals "can," but "ought" implies "can."
8
Not "ought equals can." Ought implies can. I can't have a moral obligation to do X (e.g., rescue a person in danger of drowning) unless I can do X. Impossibility negates duty, just as in law impossibility is a defense.
10
Kant never says ought equals can - he says ought implies can - meaning you can only do something you have the ability to do - they are not the same
6
Framing error...
52
I think I am agreeing with you,
Are you referring to the first two paragraphs? Because they don't make sense to me.
"It would be absurd to suggest that we should do what we couldn’t possibly do" is NOT saying that “'ought' implies 'can'”; it's saying the opposite, "that our moral obligations can’t exceed our abilities...", in other words, that "ought" DOESN'T imply "can."
And the whole rest of the article sets out to prove that "ought" doesn't imply "can." Which leaves me to wonder: what did Kant actually say?
But since I'm dealing with philosophers here, I must be missing something. Maybe it's the convoluted way philosophers try to explain themselves?
"It would be absurd to suggest that we should do what we couldn’t possibly do" is NOT saying that “'ought' implies 'can'”; it's saying the opposite, "that our moral obligations can’t exceed our abilities...", in other words, that "ought" DOESN'T imply "can."
And the whole rest of the article sets out to prove that "ought" doesn't imply "can." Which leaves me to wonder: what did Kant actually say?
But since I'm dealing with philosophers here, I must be missing something. Maybe it's the convoluted way philosophers try to explain themselves?
I'm not sure if this is what you mean, but it is erroneous to call this stuff philosophy. The essential purpose of philosophy is to rise above popular delusions, not to pander to them.
1
2) The conclusion of this article seems to violate the is/ought fallacy, that is to say that it conflates how people in fact act and what they in fact think about ethics (the “is”) with how they ought to act. Yes, the study participants correlated “blame” with “ought” instead of “can,” but that is a description of what “is” not how people “ought” to act. “Ought implies can” is an “ought” principle, an explanation for under what circumstances a person is released from a moral obligation. The descriptive fact that not everybody agrees with that is not a refutation of a normative imperative – especially when that empirical study completely fails to say anything about the center of Kantian ethics, i.e. the Categorical Imperative.
This ties into a larger problem I have with neuroethics in general, namely the way in which so many neuroethicists blatantly violate the is/ought fallacy in their conclusions. Neuroethics is an empirical enterprise, but there’s far more to ethics than simple empiricism, especially when it comes to normative ethics. When neuroethicists try to make normative conclusions, they over reach more often than not. Neuroethics belongs primarily to the field of descriptive ethics and should be far more humble about crossing over into normative ethics than it currently is.