Hi, I wonder has anyone suggested putting parachutes
On the plane's on the outside like is on the space shuttle. If not and it works remember I suggested it. Maybe at a
Certain time and speed and altitude if there having problems the pilot could release the shoots. However if for some reason it wouldn't work please let me know privately so I won't get a bunch of feedback. Because I'm not a engineer just a 67 year old retired photographer and mother whos afraid of flying however I have flown in a helicopter and a plane from Hattiesburg to Memphis, I've recently found a sister in Washington state and our
brother in Indiana we lost touch with them when there father took them to there grandmother's in New York they were babies barely walking when I last saw them we tried to find them but then he quickly moved them to Indiana so we never did until we had some news from Ancestry and my brother that was adopted when he was a baby there were 9 of us separated but we newof them and loved them from a far. I would love to feel safe enough to fly to Washington state to meet her. I've been able to meet and spend time with the two brother's but now we have nephews and niece's I've never seen. Thank's
It is OK for Boeing to thank Ethiopian airlines for the data they supplied, but for Boeing to test aircraft with passengers on board, that is beyond the limit.
All in a bid to compete with Airbus.
They say the engines are bigger then the old model and further forward, making balance less stable, so they fitted this anti stall device. Not clever, make the aircraft stable. Poor design Boeing.
I am puzzled about something in this case. After the Lion crash it was said that the AoA ( angle of attack) sensor failed and caused the crash. The preceding flight also experienced the same difficulty but a jump-seat pilot knew how to turn off the MCAS.
But the data published said that after landing the plane would automatically switch from the left to the right AoA sensor. That says both sensors must have been faulity.
One source for the above is
https://aviationweek.com/commercial-aviation/boeing-max-changes-add-redundancy-pilot-control?NL=AW-05&Issue=AW-05_20190328_AW-05_81&sfvc4enews=42&cl=article_2&utm_rid=CPEN1000009580435&utm_campaign=18984&utm_medium=email&elq2=a918bff57c26438ebbc9eccf260376d9
What am i missing here.
Hard foe me to comprend Boeing to sell a plane with extras that are safety features. Is boeing now making a Renault instead of a Jaguar. Shame on them . Did they forget they are in the air lnstead of on the ground. ..?
Why company like Boeing, play with life of people, just for money, they should have given compulsory, standard safety, features on every model, that helps, pilot detect erroneous reading, and should not, sold as extra, it's just like you, are buying, a plane, and not able to buy the fuel to run it. Boeing, should understand, the importance of passengers safety first. When passengers plane is monopolised, business, by just 2 company around the world. Boeing and airbus then why run for money. Thank you.
While the investigation is still early, there seems to be a connection between the MCAS system and the failure of sensors. Why are sensors for new planes failing? I would think such failures would not show up until the plane has been in service for several years?
I have read that the problems have developed only when the autopilot is engaged. Is this correct? If so, why wouldn't pilots turn it back off as soon as they experienced control problems?
And then just fly the plane.
Boeing made at lest 2 mistakes on this aircraft. One was to let the MSAC system take over command of the aircraft from the pilot. Another was to neglect to train the pilots that the system even existed to make short term gains in selling aircraft. This puts the responsibility for the Lion crash in the hands of Boeing.
While this resulted in the sales of 5000 aircraft it will do little good if people decide not to fly this plane.
The entire approach of overpowering a 737 aircraft resulted in plane that is not stable and never should have been certified.
Also the MCAS system should not be confused with the autopilot which is entirely separate.
Also the Leap engine was the 2nd engine change as the Next Generation version of the 737 was made by enlarging the engine.
I've seen data on how many 737 Max 8's are currently in service, so in one sense I can get a feel for one statistic that way. But I think a better way would be to compare the total number of cycles (combination take off & landing) the fleet has had with the 2 that crashed. And if possible add in other cycles where the pilots experienced a similar problem but recovered control. Is there any way to get data like this?
If this data isn't available, do we know the average number of cycles each plane of this type flies in a typical day or week?
Is there an issue with the design of the Max...installing larger engines on unmodified wings?
Why is there a need for software to keep the aircraft level to compensate for upward pitch due to the larger engine?
It seems to me a good design should be sufficient.
I am speculating that the 737 Max has a major design flaw that makes it aerodynamically unstable, and the MCAS software cannot overcome that 100% of the time.
For years, the FAA has been concerned that the new generation of pilots are too dependent on the autopilot, and are not actually flying the plane by hand very much.
In my experience, more technology = more problems, unless you learn and practice all the details.
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@Bruce from Earth. It’s not a design flaw. .lts a electrial malfunction in laymon terms. Things do fail but Boeing should not of had pay for extra safety features. Hindsight..
Once upon a time, Boeing had a fantastic airplane called the 737. But eventually times changed, the 737 began to show its age, and markets demanded something better. Boeing might have designed another, new fantastic airplane to satisfy those markets for another 50 years. But Boeing adopted the business model of serial shortcutting, "patching" it's old workhorse, instead. End of story.
The 737Max case presents a dramatic example of faulty technology driven by greed. After a long and very successful history of the 737, in aeronautical engineering terms, the MAX scheme was clearly a step too far. It appears that the bean counters won out over the engineers who had to produce a quick and cheap lash up rather than a proper design.
The most troubling aspect of this case is why did the regulator (the FAA) approve same.
1
What type of Boeing plane is air force one?
@Betsy Ross
747
Wall Street is giddy over the prospect of the "software fix" being ready in early April. "The fix! The Fix!" they say, and it will save "The stock! The stock!" Buy, buy buy.
It reminds me of Glengarry Glen Ross, where the desperate salesmen are all going on about "The leads! The leads!"
But why would anyone be satisfied with this "software fix"? After all, we now have a second deadly crash to gather data from. The software fix was made in response to the first crash. Even if it was an awesome response to the Lion Air disaster, might there not be new information gleaned from Ethiopia that would inform additional "fixes"?
(Of course, all of this leaves out the question of whether software alone can fix things with the 737 Max.)
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My comment is about all these new "smart electronic devices". Increasingly, I am experencing unexpected behaviors from my iPhone, for example. AI is making it "do" things that I cannot predict or explain, sometimes causing me trouble understanding what is going on. Therefore, I am aware now that I cannot be sure everything is always ok with its behavior and signals, and I have to check with my still well functioning brain. Maybe that should be the same for airplane pilots?
My thought is very simple.
When booking a flight all passenger must ask what plane type is being used for the route(s) asked for and then simly refuse any flight with the 737 8 or 9 MAX.
This will have all airlines act immediately: their revenue will disappear.
Question: Is there an audio/visual warning to the pilots that the computer has "Assumed Control"? Can you turn the thing (MCAS) off?
@Ben
A good question, and one I wish reporters would ask. having an enhanced AOA readout on the "heads down" display is optional equipment on a 737 Max. AA opted for this, while Southwest did not -- until after the Lion Air disaster. So, now *some* 737 Max pilots have ready information about what the sensors are reading. But, as you ask, is there also an visual and/or audible warning when the MCAS "kicks in"?
Boeing's statement that the only way to overide this new "safety" system is to "remove power" should not be acceptible. Requiring a both pilots to disable and trim manually seems to be accepted, yet given any problem during critical take-off and landing that requires that of pilots who may have other issues on board and other traffic always nearby is not valid. If that is their answer that continues with "new software" the FAA should require 100% of that system removed or entirely disabled until they prove safety. Fly by wire schemes seem to have to kill hundreds before any doubts arise. Pilots will die with their passengers, all that software and hardware will not - it's not about AI, it's that humans paid to make difficult decisions to save lives cannot be fought off by any mechanical system. If Boeing believed or even suspected that they owned a fix after the first crash they should have disabled this system or grounded the planes themselves. No excuses no punting to anyone. If Corporations were ethical they would ground the planes, pay for temporary replacements, compensate the families, airlines and apologize. They have lots of money and would at least exhibit the integrity we should expect from a very critical defense contractor.
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We need to know who (names and ages) designed this fiasco: Engines so large they would have scraped the ground, so they were moved three feet forward along the wings, thus making the plane not airworthy.
An automatic (artificial "intelligence") system to compensate for the lack of airworthiness (and resultant stalling upon takeoff) by pointing the plane toward the ocean or ground. Repeatedly!
Deliberate failure to wire both angle of attack sensors to the computer, so false readings from one could not be compared to correct readings from the second.
Decision to keep this suicidal (or murderous) system hidden from the pilots.
My guess is that most of the employees involved in this murderous fiasco were "teams" of millenials, who are well known for their inability to think. If so, this is not just a Boeing issue. It's an issue for all of society. These "team players" must somehow be prevented from working on projects where their inability to think will endanger the rest of us.
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How many times do we have to face faulty readings? Boeing should go back to basics of flying & redesign flight system. You can’t have too much automation. It has to be a combination of analog & digital technologies. Frozen pitot tubes, remember? Isn’t it obvious? Wonder what decisions go into manufacturing. When an alarm sounds in the cockpit, there’s not much time to review manuals for a solution. There’s got to be a better way.
I'm worried that the lag in Boeing response to this crisis is based on the inability to fix the software because the 737 max airplanes are unflyable without the software that is causing the issue. As I have learned from the public reporting the system is more than just an antistall program, its part and parcel of flying the MAX versions of the 737 which are extended versions of the regular 737. As anyone that knows a little of flight dynamics making changes to the basic design of an aircraft leads to different aerodynamic balance and flight characteristics. It appears that Boeing has addressed this issue by using software to essentially make all versions of the plane seem the same from a piloting perspective in effect, pilots are not really piloting the plane they are giving instructions to the computer which in turn translates those inputs into actions by the airplane. This is not new, its inherent to all "fly by wire" modern aircraft. The issue I think they are not making public is that its more complicated than simply "turning off" or patching the code that controls the antistall portion of the system, but rather that, that part of the code is a key component of the control system. Such a fault would force the engineers to write the whole thing again, a massive undertaking that would take a very long time and would require a complete new verification process from the FAA. It would cost billions.
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Boeing is an American company, and the tragedy of the 737 Max 8 and Max 9, both reliant on technology that is perhaps a bit too complex, reflects a larger problem--when in doubt, Americans look to more money and more technology. The old saw, "pragmatic is clever and clever is wise" is not part of the thinking of current generation of engineers at Boeing. New is not always better, but in American culture, that is like saying that Raquel Welch is the Anti-Christ. Why make a "super-max" 737 in the first place? It's like the '66 Mustang--why change it? Ah, an engineer at Ford said, "Hmmm, maybe we can sell more Mustangs if we do this and we do that, alakazzzamm, presto gizmo, it's newer, now!" If it ain't broke, don't fix it--a lesson lost on Boeing.
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Indeed change is not always better. The casualties have paid a huge price for Boeing's ignorance and arrogance in this regard.@Mike Tucker
They changed the engines and the new ones were larger diameter, so they raised the wings to keep the engines from hitting the ground. This was supposed to have little to no effect, but turned out not to be true. Let's talk about this!
3
What is not discussed, much less explained, is the faulty instrument readings that occurred BEFORE the MCAS system took over the plane. There appears to have been faulty readings unrelated to the MCAS system. Thus, there were at least two major issues: 1. Faulty instrument readings; and, 2. Inability to override the MCAS system.
5
The 737 dates back to the 1960's. The aircraft could take a beating in the air (I was weightless in a 737 in turbulence). The short wheel struts allowed baggage loading & unloading without fancy equipment, which made it very popular around the world. And a low cost US airline who would not stop buying the 737. Boeing obliged by making the 737 larger with more powerful and efficient engines. Modern high bypass engines have very large engines. The short wheel struts became a huge (pun) liability. I hate flying in 737's. With two hundred passengers and the drinks cart in the aisle, getting to the bathrooms in the tail is a "challenge".
1
The President was right to ground the Max series until the cause of the crashes have been uncovered and fixed. It will take awhile to figure it out a formulate a fix, most likely a software upgrade. It is beyond belief that the Boeing Co. dragged this out, given the similarities of both crashes, instead of leading the effort to get to the bottom of this after the Lion Air crash.
1
When will the Max 9 be grounded? If it uses the same system is it only escaping grounding because it has not crashed (yet)?
1
i noticed the US President reminded citizens that the USA has the best flight record in the world . I think he meant Australia....and if he looked up google for the worst he may get as shock
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@dgl i think u misread. The president said Boeing is a phenomenol company. 737s are the most popular planes in history.
@Concerned citizen
Along with being the most popular plane manufacturer, and most likely, having sold the most airplanes, it looks like it also ranks as the #1 company having the most "events".*
http://www.airsafe.com/events/models/rate_mod.htm
*As of December 13, 2014
What about the Boeing 737 Max 900 ?
Gentlemen
There are a few open questions that I would like answered if possible!
1- News report said eye witness saw smoke trailing the jet before it went into a nose dive!
If true the crash has a mechanical cum electrical basis that may not be a parallel to the other max crash.
Also suggests a disintegration os either the luggage hold or the air frame.
Maintenance oversight on newly designed airplane may not be the only issue here.
2- on day of flight US embassy issued an alert to avoid the airport and center of city.
Putting the two together suggests more than a lack of fault tolerance in the stabilizing SW.
Thank you.
How about answering this question: What is the impact on US flight capacity as a result of grounding this plane model? In other words, will airlines need to cancel future flights while the investigation occurs? If so, what is the estimate of % of flights to be impacted?
1
I remember a novel about a new device on planes that caused these problems. Pilots were unaware of the device or how to turn it off. It took over control of the plane. An engineer knew but couldn’t reveal the information. It was just fiction but so similar.
2
To replace these grounded planes are older planes being pressed into service? What is their condition and what are the new safety risks introduced changing routines?
3
It strikes me as inconcieveable that this aeronautical engineering juggernaut(Boeing), would not have detected serious issues with the control system on the 737-800 Max before it's release to commercial air carriers. Design success would require tens of thousands of hours of computer simulator runs, that certainly would have set off alarm bells to this glaring issue. How is it possible to let a design defect proceed down the production line, out the door onto the runway, only to result in 2 massive unforgiveable loss of lives. Boeing must be held accountable.
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They had to relocate the wing, which apparently throws everything else off.
@Phil Houser We don't have all the answers yet.
1
@Phil Houser
Here's a start on answering your question:
https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/failed-certification-faa-missed-safety-issues-in-the-737-max-system-implicated-in-the-lion-air-crash/
The erratic trajectory of the 737 MAC 8 in both the Lion Air crash, as well as the Epiothian Air crash are shockingly similar, as was the vertical decent before crash. Although I am not educated in avionics, this tells me that there were definitely problems with the MCAS systems in both planes. Certainly Boeing has some explaining to do.
1
@Robert Koch These are probably not isolated incidents either. On Tuesday night, several friends of mine flew a red-eye from Ecuador to Philadelphia on a 737 Max 8; they described take-off and the first 15 minutes of the flight as "rocky."
The F-35 can also barely fly due to endless software problems. Aircraft software is getting too complex. Anyone who knows how often Windows crashes or freezes should realize planes rely on software even more complex.
6
@Jim Mooney a modern fighter simply cannot fly WITHOUT software. These accidents are not comparable. They occurred in relatively resource-poor environments with perhaps minimal training. The economies of the new passenger airplanes might be almost too attractive for marginal airlines. Have such incidents occurred -- and been managed by experienced pilots -- in airplanes flown by top airplanes?
2
@Reuel
I disagree on 2 points.
1. Have a look at the list of countries buying the Max 8 and Max 9.*
2. Blaming the lesser economic countries and marginal airlines is a poor excuse for the plane crashes. The USA has the most jet crashes in the world**
*https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Boeing_737_MAX_orders_and_deliveries
**https://www.businessinsider.com/airplane-accident-statistics-by-region-2015-11
The general understanding is that you are more at risk when driving to the airport than you are once on the plane. Given that Boeing 737s are flying all around the world 24/7 I'm wondering how the odds look if we just consider this one 'risky' plane and these two accidents. My guess is..still pretty good. Perhaps someone with more thorough access to the numbers might reply.
1
You're quite right that flying is, on average, much, much safer than driving. It's a very safe way to travel. I have a terrible fear of flying and the only way I can manage it is to keep repeating this to myself, over and over, during the flight. For me, this works.
That said, if there's a design problem with a type of airplane, all flights on that particular kind of airplane might not be, on average, acceptably safe. There's no way to know until a thorough investigation is made. I'm glad all these planes have been pulled now. I want all of us to actually be safe, not just to feel safe.
1
@C. Mayer
The average road trip is 17 miles. The average plane trip is 1837 miles. Also, there is much more space between planes than there is between drivers. Also, pilots aren't texting on their cell phones. So there are a number of reasons why airflight is so much safer. But if we let idiots make design errors as moronic as these, the relative safety of the two modes of travel will begin to converge.
1
The 737 is my least favorite airplane. It didn't start out that way. Originally, a medium range plane, it grew in length and more importantly, range, about 20 years ago with new engines and a new wing. Over time it has completely replaced the 757, a larger, but similarly configured airplane that was far more comfortable to fly in with its 3 x 3 seating.
As the 737 "grew" it became a terrible plane for passengers but a great plane for airlines, because it is cheaper than the 757. But the cramped seating, reasonable for shorter flights, is painful in transcontinental and longer flights.
Just looking at the plane, it seems like there's a problem. The engines are now way ahead of the wing - they used to be under it. I remember a story about how super computers made this possible, enabling Boeing to create a nacelle that would prevent problems with airflow over the wing. But, as the plane grew much longer, it appears they had to create a system to prevent problems with flight control. Is the Max now equivalent to an F-117 (original stealth "fighter"), unstable in some flight conditions?
6
John, the 757 and 737 share the same fuselage as the 727 and 707. There is no difference in the fuselage. The 757 was supposed to replace the 727 but not many were sold, airlines continued using the 727.
2
@John The Max 8 sounds like a bit of Frankenstein and frankly, not inspiring confidence.
"The day before the Lion Air crash, the pilots who flew the same airplane reported problems with the angle-of-attack sensor, which tells pilots the angle of the airplane as it passes through the air. Maintenance workers at Lion Air replaced the sensor, and the plane was put back in service to fly as Flight 610."
The flight crew on this flight manged to figure out what to do and fortunately had sufficient time/altitude to do so. But what they did wasn't passed on. They disconnected the MCAS via switches in the cockpit for that purpose and moved the stabilizer manually. This was reported in WSJ article that I don't have anymore.
And this answers another question. The MCAS system is apparently engaged when the flaps are fully up and the autopilot is off. And it can be disconnected at any time via cockpit switches. In fact this is what allows the system to be categorized as hazardous but not flight critical.
Someone, not me, who has a more detailed view of the architecture would be able to say what the design was supposed to do, but most potential pilots probably weren't aware of all aspects because Boeing emphasized the seamless nature of the transition to this 737 version. Recall that the Brazilian airworthiness regulators didn't agree and required airlines they supervised to perform additional simulator training.
3
One answer notes that an airline might not have good maintenance practices. How can this possibly be? Why aren’t maintenance routines strictly regulated and monitored? Can poor performers be publicized?
3
In the chemical industry, it is totally unacceptable to have a single point of failure (angle of attack sensor, for example) whose failure could cause loss of life. When loss of life is involved, especially loss of life of the public at large, backup responses that will protect against the failure resulting in loss of life are required. These backup responses must reduce the probability of the loss of life by at least four or five orders of magnitude. A human (pilot) response to the failure, in order to avoid the loss of life, is generally assessed to make less that one order of magnitude (a tenfold) reduction in the odds that the failure will result in loss of life. The US aviation industry, the FAA's, the NTSB's, Boeing, American and Southwest's response to this problem would be a completely unacceptable response in other industries. Why is it acceptable in the US aviation industry?
18
Bob, there are redundant systems. There are three computers and AOA sensors.
1
Are there any other planes, besides the 737 Max 8, that utilize the strange V-shaped tips at the end of the wings, and why does this model have it?
4
I wish the author had done more to answer the questions at hand than stoke the fire.
Two correct two misleading answers:
A quick review of the federal database where pilots anonymously report service irregularities reveals that several people have successfully helmed a 737 8 Max through a known irregular operation of the MCAS system.
Many of today's commercial and civil aircraft have similar technology that influence the speed, direction, accent, or descent of an aircraft. That this particular plane and this specific system has received so much attention is a media spectacle to say the least.
4
@ABNY
"this specific system has received so much attention is a media spectacle to say the least."
If the media hadn't made this jet and the 2 crashes a "spectacle", I would hate to say it, but there could have been a 3rd crash! As well, this jet would not have been grounded.
In this case (as in many others), the press did a "spectacular" job!
I would Look into The AOA Generator this angle of attack generator if malfunctioning would send bad data to the flight computer and cause serious problems for the pilots in command. I believe Air bus had the same problem a few years back. And it was faulty AOA sensors.
@Jim
Yes, a 2014 Lufthansa flight out of Spain. An A321 with two faulty alpha vanes, which "outvoted" the functioning one, causing the automated system to push the nose down. A rare thing but a potentially deadly one. Fortunately the plane was at 31,000 feet when it happened. Note that the A321 uses three alpha vanes while the B737 max only uses two -- a carryover from the NG.
"Beware of canceling a ticket because you don’t want to fly on the Max 8. The airline probably won’t refund your money or let you rebook without a penalty."
This seems a bit insensitive on the part of airlines.
Most aircraft seat cushions operate as "floatation devices in the unlikely event of a water landing," as flight attendants usually announce. Since on these particular planes crashing into the ground is more likely than water landing, may passengers stuck with these reservations opt for a parachute rather than the floatation device?
I have noted that the black boxes of the crashed aircraft wI'll be sent "overseas" for analysis. I can only hope that this destination will be outside the US and not within a jurisdiction where Boeing has the ability to cover up the true findings.
12
First of all they are aviation orange colored. A requirement. I assure you Boeing and the FAA have the original if not copies. You know we in the US are “overseas”.
@Paulie Of course they are conspicuously orange-colored, but nonetheless the devices known technically as "flight data recorder" and "cockpit voice recorder" are informally called "black boxes". The etymology, I believe, dates back to World War II, when British/Allied forces would carry secretive electronic devices around in non-reflective (black) housing. For whatever reason, "black box" stuck around and became a misnomer for the devices now mandatory in modern commercial aviation.
As for the destination of the EA black boxes: they are widely reported as now being in France. I see little to no likelihood of Boeing/FAA "having the originals", given their total lack of jurisdiction over the matter. Finally, you cannot "make copies" of black box data in the space of a few days; this is not Xeroxing of a table plan, this is highly complicated, encoded information.
3
It offends me that so many U.S. regulators like the FAA and FDA seem to have a hand in glove relationship with airlines, Big Pharma, herbicides etc. NO business should be permitted to keep operating when its product has been shown to be unsafe. Personal safety always trumps profit. If business refuses to cooperate, it should be boycotted.
Is the 737 Max-8 flyable using manually operated controls without computer assistance?
4
Robert Pryor what do you think the yokes, rudder pedals, thrust levers are for, looks?
@Paulie It was a valid question. Not all of us are aviators.
1
@Paulie
They will do little good if the plane is inherently unstable and requires the speed of a computer to manipulate the aircraft control surfaces.
1
It’s been 5 months since the Lion Air crash. Any results available from that investigation?
4
Is there a manual over-ride for the computerized auto pilot system? If not, one is needed.
1
In reading the reports of the Indonesian crash and reports of the origin of the 737 Max 8 jet it appears that Boeing's design for the jet was unstable. They attempted to correct the problem with a 'software workaround.' They further chose not to train the pilots in the new program, rather they put a section in the flight manual and issued a notice that it was there. The FAA agreed to this.
When the MCAS system malfunctions during takeoff you have a situation where the jet is under full power very close to the ground. Having the software point the nose down during takeoff is bound to cause panic in the pilots, there is simply no room for error at this time. Asking them to remember a procedure buried in the flight manual, that they have not been allowed to practice, during a chaotic emergency is expecting too much. It should never come to that.
It is incumbent on jet manufactures to produce stable planes. Software workaround should never be allowed. The Boeing 737 Max 8 and if necessary Max 9, must be withdrawn from service until the instability problem can be structurally fixed. If that means different engines and plane modifications, so be it. Only when that is done, tested and certified safe, should the plane be allowed to return to flight. We will then need to have a conversation about the culpability of Boeing and the FAA in killing 300+ people.
12
Condolences to the near and dear of those who lost their lives in this tragedy. It’s beyond comprehension that an aviation pioneer like Boeing would continue to keep its model in service, despite knowing that there is a probability that the plane could fly erratically, and would require intervention by a trained pilot/copilot. They should have learnt from Lion Air disaster.
Even at the time of this writing, Boeing and FAA consider Max as airworthy. At first I thought that perhaps North American Airlines properly train their pilots. But now Canada too has banned Max.
Boeing can still save itself from further embarrassment by stopping the operations and thoroughly checking for any flaws in this model.
They would earn immense goodwill if the model turns out to be flawless.
1
I really hope Boeing redesigns its manfucturing process to maintain basic flight control when automation fails for whatever reason. The design should be such that, flight basics are not compromised in the event of non-mechanical failures. Despite having backup systems, a crash of this nature is astonishing. Did the pilots try to turn off auto pilot?
Did they engage autopilot too soon?
If they had altitude, most likely they would have made it back to airport. Looks like Precious time was lot trying to take control. Maybe, general operation should be to not make any major changes to flight till it reaches a safe height & atleast flying for 15 mts.
This should never happen again. RIP to victims.
We have seen two deadly accidents spaced 5 months apart, with the same aircraft, under similar circumstances, and with pilot feedback regarding the plane's questionable software reactions. One would hope that Boeing and the FAA would err on the side of life safety as opposed to denying a possible problem until a full investigation is completed. I'd also like to see them develop an automation system that could be fully disengaged by the pilots when a software malfunction is evident instead of just redesigning their software. Haven't they ever had a computer crash and need to reboot? Unfortunately when you're diving straight down in a plane rebooting is not an option.
4
Max density. Yes.
Max discomfort. Yes.
Max risk. TBD.
Regarding your comment "Outside of that event (the Lion Air AOA sensor problem), which was revealed after the crash, there have been no other public reports of pilots experiencing this kind of problem." There are several public reports of 737 MAX uncommanded pitch down incidents right after take off. (See, e.g., https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/pilots-have-reported-issues-in-us-with-new-boeing-jet/2019/03/12/9299301a-4509-11e9-94ab-d2dda3c0df52_story.html) These reports may not implicate the MCAS system, since in each case the pitch down occurred when the autopilot was engaged. However, the pitch down maneuver described in these reports was the same as what caused the Lion Air crash and required fast action by the pilot to rectify the situation.
1
“[T]he MCAS would force the airplane into a cycle of repeated dives. The pilot could stop this cycle only by removing power from a control surface.“
How, exactly, would a pilot remove power from a control surface? Is this something an average pilot would know how to do in real time? I mean, if a plane is insisting on crashing in a few seconds, there’s no time to consult the manual or call tech services.
2
The stab trim power switches are on the center panel between the pilots and are easily accessible as they are on every large aircraft. They are literally within arm’s reach while sitting in either pilot seat.
I’ve worked on the 727, 737, 747, 757, 767, Super 80, DC-9, DC-10, MD-11 and the A300 in 40 years at a major airline, actually two after a bankruptcy.
3
The question remains? Were the cockpit trim wheels rotating continuously when the problem started? The answer explains everything!
According to the New York Times, two US pilots have filed reports relating similar safety concerns with the Max 8 and a Chinese pilot related that there were problems with vertical lift measures on take off.
I sure hope FAA is not as confused as the media reporting on this topic:
"What they could not train for — because they did not know — was that the MCAS would force the airplane into a cycle of repeated dives. The pilot could stop this cycle only by removing power from a control surface [the horizontal stabilizer]."
What?
So, addressing the situation was not as simple as disabling the MCAS?
That repeated nose diving would continue until the pilots ALSO removed power from the horizontal stabilizer?
This is simply not acceptable. Ground 'em.
5